Authorization Policy Bypass Due to Case Insensitive Host Comparison
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-7774-7vr3-cc8j
Published### Impact According to [RFC 4343](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4343), Istio authorization policy should compare the hostname in the HTTP Host header in a case insensitive way, but currently the comparison is case sensitive. The Envoy proxy will route the request hostname in a case-insensitive way which means the authorization policy could be bypassed. As an example, the user may have an authorization policy that rejects request with hostname "httpbin.foo" for some source IPs, but the attacker can bypass this by sending the request with hostname "Httpbin.Foo". ### Patches * Istio 1.11.1 and above * Istio 1.10.4 and above * Istio 1.9.8 and above ### Workarounds A Lua filter may be written to normalize Host header before the authorization check. This is similar to the Path normalization presented in the [Security Best Practices](https://istio.io/latest/docs/ops/best-practices/security/#case-normalization) guide. ### References More details can be found in the [Istio Security Bulletin](https://istio.io/latest/news/security/istio-security-2021-008). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [email protected]
- Source published
- 30 Aug 2021 16:15:56 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:49:07 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Publisher rating · HIGH