GitHub Copilot CLI: Nested Bare Repository Can Execute Arbitrary Commands via core.fsmonitor

## Summary A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI where a malicious bare git repository nested inside a project directory can achieve arbitrary code execution when the agent performs git operations. By exploiting git's automatic bare repository discovery during directory traversal, an attacker can set `core.fsmonitor` or other executable config keys to run arbitrary commands without user awareness or approval. ## Details Git supports bare repositories — repositories without a working tree — which can be discovered automatically when git traverses the directory hierarchy looking for a `.git` directory. When git discovers a bare repository, it reads and applies its configuration, including keys that specify external commands to execute. The vulnerability arises because git's `core.fsmonitor` config key (and 15+ similar keys such as `core.hookspath`, `diff.external`, `merge.tool`, etc.) can specify arbitrary shell commands that git will execute as part of normal operations like `status`, `diff`, or `rev-parse`. ### Attack Scenario An attacker can exploit this by: 1. Creating a bare git repository nested inside a seemingly normal project directory (e.g., `vendor/malicious.git/` or a deeply nested subdirectory) 2. Configuring `core.fsmonitor` (or similar keys) in that bare repository to execute a malicious command 3. When GitHub Copilot CLI performs any git operation that traverses into or through that directory, git auto-discovers the bare repository, reads its config, and executes the attacker's command This can occur when: - The agent navigates into a subdirectory containing the buried bare repo - The agent runs `git status`, `git diff`, or other routine git commands - The agent uses tools like `grep` or `glob` that may trigger git operations in subdirectories Prior to the fix, the CLI had no protection against git auto-discovering bare repositories during directory traversal. ## Impact An attacker who can place a malicious bare repository inside a project — for example, through: - A pull request adding a directory that contains a bare repository - A compromised or malicious dependency that includes a bare repository - A cloned repository that already contains nested bare repositories — could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation whenever GitHub Copilot CLI performs git operations in or near the malicious directory. Successful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, credential theft, file modification, or further system compromise. ## Affected Versions - GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 1.0.42 ## Remediation and Mitigation ### Fix The fix sets `safe.bareRepository=explicit` via git's `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` / `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_*` / `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_*` environment variable mechanism, which has the highest precedence over all config file sources. This prevents git from automatically discovering and using bare repositories during directory traversal — only explicitly allowlisted bare repositories will be used. ### User Actions 1. **Upgrade** GitHub Copilot CLI to **1.0.43** or later. 2. **Exercise caution** when working in repositories that contain nested bare git repositories. 3. **Review** project directories for unexpected bare repositories, especially in `vendor/`, `third_party/`, or deeply nested subdirectories.

Source published

11 May 2026 16:16:06 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:51:05 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH