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Nitro has an Open Redirect via Protocol-Relative URL Bypass in Wildcard Route Rules

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-9phm-9p8f-hw5m

Published

A redirect route rule like: ```ts routeRules: { "/legacy/**": { redirect: "/**" } } ``` is intended to rewrite paths within the same host. Before the patch, an attacker could turn the rewrite into a cross-host redirect by sliding an extra slash in after the rule prefix. Example exploit: ``` GET /legacy//evil.com ``` Nitro stripped `/legacy` from the matched pathname and joined the remainder against the rule's target. The remainder was `//evil.com`, which the join preserved verbatim, so Nitro responded with `Location: //evil.com`. Browsers resolve `//evil.com` as a protocol-relative URL against the current scheme, sending the user to `https://evil.com`. ### Are you affected? Users may be affected if **all** of the following are true: 1. Their project uses Nitro's `routeRules` with a `redirect` entry. 2. The target uses a `/**` wildcard suffix to forward sub-paths (e.g. `redirect: "/**"`, `redirect: "/new/**"`, `proxy: { to: "http://upstream/**" }`). 3. The `redirect` rule is _not_ handled natively at the CDN layer. The `vercel`, `netlify`, `cloudflare-pages`, and `edgeone` presets translate `routeRules.redirect` into platform config (`vercel.json`, `_redirects`, EdgeOne v3 config) and serve the redirect at the edge — those deployments bypass the Nitro runtime entirely and are not affected. Every other preset executes the redirect through the Nitro runtime and can be vulnerable. ## Impact Open redirect from any host serving Nitro with a wildcard `redirect` rule. The redirect target is fully attacker-controlled, the URL looks legitimate (it starts with the victim's domain), and the browser silently follows it. ## Patched versions Upgrade to one of: - [2.13.4](https://github.com/nitrojs/nitro/releases/tag/v2.13.4) or later (or upgrade lockfile with latest ufo 1.6.4+) - [3.0.260429-beta](https://github.com/nitrojs/nitro/releases/tag/v3.0.260429-beta) or later (https://github.com/nitrojs/nitro/pull/4236) The fix has two parts: 1. `ufo` is bumped to `^1.6.4` ([unjs/ufo@5cd9e67](https://github.com/unjs/ufo/commit/5cd9e676711af3f4e4b5398ddf6ca8d52c1c7e1f)), which collapses any run of leading slashes to a single `/` inside `withoutBase`. This covers the typical `"/scope/**"` rule. 2. The Nitro runtime additionally collapses leading `//` before joining when the rule path itself is `/**` (in rare case which case `withoutBase` is never called and the raw pathname flows straight into `joinURL("", …)`).

Source published
6 May 2026 23:02:45 UTC
Source modified
9 Jun 2026 02:15:07 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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