Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Koa Vulnerable to Open Redirect via Trailing Double-Slash (//) in back Redirect Logic

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-g8mr-fgfg-5qpc

Published

### Summary: A bypass was discovered in the `Koa.js` framework affecting its back redirect functionality. In certain circumstances, an attacker can manipulate the Referer header to force a user’s browser to navigate to an external, potentially malicious website. This occurs because the implementation incorrectly treats some specially crafted URLs as safe relative paths. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow attackers to perform phishing, social engineering, or other redirect-based attacks on users of affected applications. This vulnerability affects the code referenced in GitHub Advisory GHSA-jgmv-j7ww-jx2x (which is tracked as CVE‑2025‑54420). ### Details: The patched code attempts to treat values that `startWith('/')` as safe relative paths and only perform origin checks for absolute URLs. However, protocol‑relative URLs (those beginning with //host) also start with '/' and therefore match the startsWith('/') branch. A protocol‑relative referrer such as `//evil.com` with trailing double-slash is treated by the implementation as a safe relative path, but browsers interpret Location: //evil.com as a redirect to https://evil.com (or http:// based on context). This discrepancy allows an attacker to supply Referer: //evil.com and trigger an external redirect - bypassing the intended same‑origin protection. ### Proof of concept (PoC): Affected line of code: https://github.com/koajs/koa/blob/master/lib/response.js#L326 The problematic logic looks like: <img width="567" height="509" alt="3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33de440a-8945-4e5f-9e0a-2011a3999458" /> Request with a protocol‑relative Referer: curl -i -H "Referer: //haymiz.dev" http://127.0.0.1:3000/test <img width="2072" height="1005" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55c48c79-559d-46aa-8b76-c1d2d3536c8b" /> Vulnerable response will contain: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: //haymiz.dev A browser receiving that Location header navigates to https://haymiz.dev (or http:// depending on context), resulting in an open redirect to an attacker‑controlled host: <img width="454" height="239" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/852ae81a-9f63-49c1-9ce5-72cd96bcea68" /> ### Recommendation / Patch: * Do not treat //host as a safe relative path. Explicitly exclude protocol‑relative values from any relative‑path branch. * Normalize the Referer by resolving it with a base (e.g., new URL(rawRef, ctx.href)), then compare resolved.origin (scheme+host+port) to ctx.origin (or ctx.host plus scheme/port) before allowing the redirect. ### Impact: An attacker who can cause a victim to visit a specially crafted link (or inject a request with a controlled Referer) can cause the victim to be redirected to an attacker‑controlled domain. This can be used for phishing, social engineering, or to bypass some protection rules that rely on same‑origin navigation.

Source published
21 Oct 2025 15:09:06 UTC
Source modified
3 Feb 2026 03:16:37 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 22 Nov 11:16 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current