OpenClaw: Focus command could miss controlScope enforcement
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-mpc8-jxjh-qpgh
Published### Summary Focus command could miss controlScope enforcement. In affected versions, a caller able to trigger the focus command could run the command without enforcing the expected control scope. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could change focus state outside the intended caller authority. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.4.25`. ### Mitigations restrict focus command access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
- Source published
- 18 Jun 2026 20:34:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Jun 2026 20:56:28 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE