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Zebra: addr/addrv2 Deserialization Resource Exhaustion

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8

Published

# CVE-2026-40881: addr/addrv2 Deserialization Resource Exhaustion ## Summary When deserializing `addr` or `addrv2` messages, which contain vectors of addresses, Zebra would fully deserialize them up to a maximum length (over 233,000) that was derived from the 2 MiB message size limit. This is much larger than the actual limit of 1,000 messages from the specification. Zebra would eventually check that limit but, at that point, the memory for the larger vector was already allocated. An attacker could cause out-of-memory aborts in Zebra by sending multiple such messages over different connections. ## Severity **Moderate** - This is a Denial of Service Vulnerability that could allow an attacker to crash a Zebra node. ## Affected Versions All Zebra versions prior to **version 4.3.1**. ## Description The vulnerability exists in the `read_addr/addrv2` functions in `codec.rs`. It deserializes a vector of addresses with the `zcash_deserialize()` trait method, which uses as a upper bound the result of `T::max_allocation()`. For theses types, it was derived from dividing the max message size (2 MiB) by the minimum serialized size of one entry. For AddrV1: 2_097_152 / 30 = 69,904. For AddrV2: 2_097_152 / 9 = 233,016. Only after deserialization was the `MAX_ADDRS_IN_MESSAGE = 1000` limit checked. An attacker could exploit this by: 1. Creating `addr` or `addrv2` messages with a large number of entries. 2. Submitting them to a Zebra node, possibly through multiple connections, to attempt to get Zebra into an out-of-memory state. ## Impact **Denial of Service** * **Attack Vector:** Network. * **Effect:** Zebra node crash. * **Scope:** Any impacted Zebra node. ## Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in **Zebra 4.3.1**. The fix changes the `max_allocation()` method for the relevant types to return 1,000, thus blocking larger values prior to deserialization. ## Mitigation Users should upgrade to **Zebra 4.3.1** or later immediately. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains not vulnerable to the denial of service attack. ## Credits Thanks @Zk-nd3r for finding and reporting the issue, and suggesting the fix.

Source published
18 Apr 2026 00:42:05 UTC
Source modified
5 May 2026 16:12:23 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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