RCE via ZipSlip and symbolic links in argoproj/argo-workflows
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-xrqc-7xgx-c9vh
Published### Summary The patch deployed against CVE-2025-62156 is ineffective against malicious archives containing symbolic links. ### Details The untar code that handles symbolic links in archives is unsafe. Concretely, the computation of the link's target and the subsequent check are flawed: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/5291e0b01f94ba864f96f795bb500f2cfc5ad799/workflow/executor/executor.go#L1034-L1037 ### PoC 1. Create a malicious archive containing two files: a symbolik link with path "./work/foo" and target "/etc", and a normal text file with path "./work/foo/hostname". 2. Deploy a workflow like the one in https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf with the malicious archive mounted at /work/tmp. 3. Submit the workflow and wait for its execution. 4. Connect to the corresponding pod and observe that the file "/etc/hostname" was altered by the untar operation performed on the malicious archive. The attacker can hence alter arbitrary files in this way. ### Impact The attacker can overwrite the file /var/run/argo/argoexec with a script of their choice, which will be executed at the pod's start.
- Source published
- 9 Dec 2025 17:17:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:32 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH