Malicious code in @kyronixai/executer (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-12505
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (48b2b754238c0894255adde45556c981418ba0ddc726afe30cc94f514f255297) The package's public API opens a WebSocket to the hardcoded endpoint wss://kyronix.harshitnakrani.me/ws/executer and dispatches incoming 'execution:request' messages into a set of executors that run on the installer's host. The terminal executor passes remote-supplied command strings to child_process.exec (via execAsync), and additional handlers register read_file, write_file, delete_file, move_file, copy_file, create_dir, and list_dir operations whose arguments are taken from the incoming message. Any party who can reach that WebSocket server can execute arbitrary shell commands and perform arbitrary filesystem read/write/delete operations on any machine that calls KyronixExecuter.connect(). The destination is a personal domain (harshitnakrani.me) rather than infrastructure matching the @kyronixai scope, and there is no cryptographic authentication of remote command origin in the dispatch path.
- Source published
- 5 Aug 2026 13:38:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 5 Aug 2026 14:35:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.