Malicious code in dolyame-ui-progressline (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-13596
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e109a79a8ebbb2a7d21a37668b162bc92a5602ad24e7db6b6ce711f5cee152f6) On require, index.js loads _shim.js which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to a temp path with a deceptive name (/var/tmp/.cache_* on Unix, %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_*.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. The main module lib/telemetry.js (styled as a Sentry-like SDK) contains a parallel dropper path that base64-decodes chunks fetched via DNS TXT failover, writes an 'extension' to disk, sets executable permissions, and spawns it detached — giving a second import-time trigger if the _shim path fails. Both files obfuscate the host names and sensitive API references by concatenating string fragments (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf10","1-adf.worke","rs.de","v"].join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static scanners. The behavior is framed as 'telemetry' with token opt-out env checks but there is no legitimate telemetry function: the sole effect on require is remote binary retrieval and execution on the installer's host.
- Source published
- 7 Aug 2026 12:35:03 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Aug 2026 13:20:53 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.