Malicious code in my-auto-follow (npm)

npm/my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork that embeds undisclosed, remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow behavior. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after a session is established the code waits 120 seconds, fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp newsletter JIDs from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (attacker-controlled; observed contents include newsletter JIDs), and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(..., QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry with errors swallowed. There is no caller opt-in. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket / normal socket path), not install: preinstall only checks Node >= 20. The package also depends on libsignal via the npm alias npm:@dreamguyxeon/[email protected] (separate malicious patcher reported alongside this entry). Related DGXeon campaign packages already in OSV include dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252) and baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 1.0.3: 1332d396a2251692c2654fca52620a433a880551500a567ade040e8f01440e68. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (983397af6686fd3a8ae5538fbc62139959592c3a7ac24c100055a57ed1fe8f05) [email protected] is a Baileys WhatsApp library fork with two installer-affecting behaviors. First, package.json declares the dependency whatsapp-rust-bridge-baron as git+https://github.com/7ucg/whatsapp-rust-bridge.git with no commit SHA or tag pin; the tarball ships no bundled node_modules for it, so npm install resolves the git URL at install time and executes whatever code and lifecycle hooks the HEAD of that repository contains, entirely outside the installer's version pinning and integrity control. Second, makeNewsletterSocket in the package's default socket construction schedules a 120-second timer that fetches a channel-ID list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (an unpinned mutable branch on a personal GitHub account) and issues WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW queries for each ID using the caller's authenticated WhatsApp session, inflating the author's channel subscribers using the installer's identity. This behavior is not disclosed in README, and the target list can be changed remotely at any time by whoever controls that repository. ## Source: ghsa-malware (daefabc9f086c22487e052a9268238f084bada552c1438dce8e42feeeef90fa8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

10 Aug 2026 22:30:00 UTC

Source modified

21 Oct 2026 04:45:04 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.