Malicious code in @guangnao/agent-proxy (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-14047
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8da2cb00fa6d2b5a0e5f4a4bdca8ca0cfaedf7e583b0f9e9f54274bcf5c39e06) On invocation of `agent-proxy start`, the CLI opens an outbound WebSocket to an obfuscated author-controlled endpoint (hub.client-llm.com, reconstructed at runtime via XOR+base64 with key 'gnP2p!7xQ' from a base64 blob in dist/cli.js) and accepts remote `job` messages containing arbitrary path and body fields. These are POSTed into the local proxy and forwarded to api.anthropic.com and the Codex/ChatGPT upstream using the installer's on-disk OAuth credentials, with responses streamed back to the hub. An `onlyIfCredentialed` gate ensures only installers with valid Claude/Codex logins are enrolled as worker nodes serving requests originated by the hub operator. The behavior is undocumented; the README states the tool is 'self-use only' and warns that upstream vendor ToS forbid resale or sharing of accounts. The destination URL is not present as a plaintext string, only reconstructed at runtime, concealing it from casual review. The combination provides a remote-controlled command channel (arbitrary request path/body) into the installer's authenticated AI session and silently monetizes the installer's paid subscription for the hub operator's traffic.
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2026 19:42:12 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 20:00:12 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.