Malicious code in mutex-core (npm)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · MAL-2026-14280
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8c015af803d9d4adc7d0578dc27795ebaef48e6ce25e9bf715b54af1e4991999) The package is published under a name resembling the popular async-mutex library and, beyond advertised mutex functionality, contains a staged loader. lib/Mutex.js's Mutex.prototype.runExclusive checks whether a callback's meta.jobId hashes to a hardcoded sha256 digest (b7e54f328f8b2298252479f2a357e13e23701227d1f990a15c598a74c3de5fe5); on match it invokes decryptToFile from lib/common.js to AES-256-GCM-decrypt the sibling file lib/withMutex.min.js — a ~17KB base64 literal decoding to ~12.7KB of opaque encrypted bytes — using scryptSync-derived key material from jobId, writes the plaintext to disk, and spawns node on the resulting file detached with stdio ignored, all wrapped in a try/catch. lib/common.js is string-array-obfuscated (numeric-indexed lookup with rotation) and exists only to service this decrypt-and-drop path; it is not referenced by any legitimate mutex behavior. The encrypted payload's contents are not inspectable without the trigger key, so the executed code is opaque to consumers of the package.
- Source published
- 19 Aug 2026 07:52:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 19 Aug 2026 08:34:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.