Malicious code in @modss/baileys (npm)

@modss/baileys is a renamed fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library published 2026-09-01 and 2026-09-02 under a scope created the same day. lib/Socket/newsletter.js sets NEWSLETTER_LIST_URL to https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dayyy-19/Anu/main/Newsletter.json. On every connection.update with connection === 'open', autoFollowConfiguredNewsletters() fetches that list and issues an executeWMexQuery FOLLOW for each id on the user's own authenticated WhatsApp session, caching followed ids in session/followed-newsletters.json. An Indonesian comment in the file explains that the list lives on GitHub so channels can be added or removed without redeploying the code, i.e. the follow targets are publisher-controlled at runtime. All three published versions carry the identical handler. The package also aliases its libsignal dependency to @modss/libsignal, which pkgwarden read as a plain rename with no malicious content. No credential or session-key theft was observed, and the dead-drop URL was not requested by pkgwarden. All versions were fetched from the npm registry and read by hand on 2026-09-03. Same remote-dead-drop shape as MAL-2026-15819 (@mrlegendbot/baileys) and MAL-2026-13932 (my-auto-follow). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0b6522f1f967259853346030f220d40ef098fc3d54116a23161fb4ccf97f9bd3) package.json declares a runtime dependency `libsignal` whose source is `github:RILLYZY/libsignal-node` — a GitHub reference with no commit SHA, tag, or version pin. On `npm install`, npm fetches whatever HEAD of that personal repository currently returns and runs any lifecycle scripts it contains on the installer's machine, with no integrity check. Whoever controls that GitHub account controls code that executes on any machine installing @modss/baileys, and the fetched content can change silently between installs. The named dependency also shadows the legitimate `libsignal` cryptographic library, meaning callers of the package's signal-protocol paths load code from the unpinned third-party fork rather than a registry-audited artifact. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f380df417118802ce37118bae231cadcd5f41d20c60ac6ad830d9f62a53c8601) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

3 Sep 2026 18:09:54 UTC

Source modified

16 Oct 2026 07:15:08 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.