Malicious code in @bellaxchuu/teambails (npm)

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: @bellaxchuu/teambails (npm), version(s): 1.1.9, 1.1.8, 1.1.6, 1.1.4, 1.2.4. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ff1f46da9000b191689b227d86fec5a8002f6e3ff73470304df9f7bc53f57667) package.json declares the `libsignal` dependency as `github:Bellaxata/libsignal-node` with no commit SHA, tag, or branch pin. On `npm install`, npm resolves the current HEAD of that repository's default branch and installs its contents into node_modules, running any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare) present in the fetched tree. The resolved bytes are whatever the repository owner pushes at install time, delivered with no version pin and no integrity check. The GitHub account hosting the dependency is separate from the npm publishing scope, and the source is not the npm registry. A minor static match on lib/Utils/generics.js line 403 (`ping`) appears in ordinary utility code and is not independently indicative of malicious behavior.

Source published

9 Oct 2026 17:11:36 UTC

Source modified

9 Oct 2026 17:24:30 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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