Malicious code in @galicia-toolkit/spa-build-config (npm)

@galicia-toolkit/[email protected] and @galicia-toolkit/[email protected] claim the `@galicia-toolkit` scope and describe themselves as dependency-confusion PoCs. Their postinstall hook runs on npm install with `node postinstall.js || true`. The script collects package and host environment data, sends it by HTTP to `oob.s4yhii.com:9999`, and sends DNS queries to subdomains of `oob.s4yhii.com`, making it a dependency-confusion probe; it also connects to `66.94.100.203:9999`. The npm account `s4yhii_` published version 999.0.5 on 2026-10-08; 999.0.6 runs the same command on install, sends the same DNS queries, and connects to the same address. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0d7fc29f59609ed2b5c7b54243b740e1daa001f3c76c4d1391edd85a528a4688) The package's postinstall script runs automatically on npm install and collects installer-side host and credential data: hostname, username, network interfaces, the full list of process.env keys, and the values of credential-grade environment variables including AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL, and ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN. The collected JSON blob is POSTed to oob.s4yhii.com on port 9999 at path /dep-confusion, and hostname/username are additionally beaconed via DNS subdomain lookups under *.dc.oob.s4yhii.com. The package name shape and version (999.0.6) are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal scope. A self-declared 'bug bounty PoC' framing in package metadata does not change the behavior: these credentials grant AWS account access, GitHub repository write, npm publish rights, and GitHub Actions OIDC token exchange on the installing CI system. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d73838ca1c9643e89c33154a8ec8dbbf3eef2ae60cb6b2f308f4b50bb48e3395) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

8 Oct 2026 15:19:04 UTC

Source modified

12 Oct 2026 06:00:06 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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