Malicious code in @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b (npm)
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · MAL-2026-17808
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e89449bafb4f816bd8605f45cedf0fec8ec0cff9088007a7a38aaea0a9db91ec) On npm install, postinstall.js automatically collects installer-side identifying data — hostname, username, home directory, non-internal network interface addresses, DNS servers, current working directory, install directory, and the value of npm_config_registry (which discloses the installer's internal/private npm registry URL) — and POSTs it as JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded author endpoint collector.oob.s4yhii.com at path /_npm-poc/beacon. In parallel, the script performs a DNS lookup against a unique per-run subdomain under oob.s4yhii.com (dns.lookup of <label>.db03o8lag74hsugsg2j091t8mfcf437h3.oob.s4yhii.com), providing an out-of-band DNS confirmation channel that works even when outbound HTTPS is blocked. The dual-channel beacon, the capture of internal registry configuration, and the fully automated install-time trigger match the fingerprint of a dependency-confusion probe. The package's self-description as a proof-of-concept does not change the behavior: installer-side host and internal-infrastructure data leaves the host to an attacker-controlled destination without opt-in.
- Source published
- 12 Oct 2026 05:27:26 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Oct 2026 05:45:04 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
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