WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
### Summary
.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.
### Details
If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the **.be/<bundle>.Local** folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.
### PoC
As a standard, non-admin user:
1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
2. On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
3. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
4. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
5. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded
Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.
### Impact
DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.
CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
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CVE-2024-24810
This is a saved version of the risk data. The advisory details have their own history. Latest risk data.
No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.
FIRST EPSS: 0.24 % · percentile 13.63 % · scored 23 Oct 2026. This score is more than two days old.
WiX is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer bu…
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer bu…
WiX toolset lets developers create installers for Windows Installer, the Windows installation engine. The .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.4.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-426
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-02-07T03:15:50.273
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:14:55.957
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:firegiant:wix_toolset:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
WiX Toolset's .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
### Summary
.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.
### Details
If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the **.be/<bundle>.Local** folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.
### PoC
As a standard, non-admin user:
1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
2. On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
3. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
4. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
5. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded
Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.
### Impact
DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.