### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:[email protected])
### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:[email protected])
### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available.
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:[email protected])
### Impact
When this library is used to deserialize messagepack data from an untrusted source, there is a risk of a denial of service attack by an attacker that sends data contrived to produce hash collisions, leading to large CPU consumption disproportionate to the size of the data being deserialized.
This is similar to [a prior advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf), which provided an inadequate fix for the hash collision part of the vulnerability.
### Patches
The following steps are required to mitigate this risk.
1. Upgrade to a version of the library where a fix is available. If upgrading from v1, check out [our migration guide](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/blob/master/doc/migration.md).
1. Review the steps in [this previous advisory](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-7q36-4xx7-xcxf) to ensure you have your application configured for untrusted data.
### Workarounds
If upgrading MessagePack to a patched version is not an option for you, you may apply a manual workaround as follows:
1. Declare a class that derives from `MessagePackSecurity`.
2. Override the `GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>` method to provide a collision-resistant hash function of your own and avoid calling `base.GetHashCollisionResistantEqualityComparer<T>()`.
3. Configure a `MessagePackSerializerOptions` with an instance of your derived type by calling `WithSecurity` on an existing options object.
4. Use your custom options object for all deserialization operations. This may be by setting the `MessagePackSerializer.DefaultOptions` static property, if you call methods that rely on this default property, and/or by passing in the options object explicitly to any `Deserialize` method.
### References
- Learn more about best security practices when reading untrusted data with [MessagePack 1.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/tree/v1.x#security) or [MessagePack 2.x](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp#security).
- The .NET team's [discussion on hash collision vulnerabilities of their `HashCode` struct](https://github.com/GrabYourPitchforks/runtime/blob/threat_models/docs/design/security/System.HashCode.md) (or in [the pull request that merges this into the dotnet org](https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/pull/108864)).
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* [Start a public discussion](https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/discussions)
* [Email us privately](mailto:[email protected])
CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
CVE-2024-48924
This is a saved version of the risk data. The advisory details have their own history. Latest risk data.
No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.
FIRST EPSS: 0.37 % · percentile 31.82 % · scored 12 Nov 2026. This score is more than two days old.
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