vLLM before 0.29.0 Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Media Materialization
Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-100650
PublishedvLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-100650 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-100650
This historical advisory does not include today's related changes. Open the latest advisory to find current connections.