Slack Morphism verifier errors disclose valid HMACs in the logs
Exact source revision recorded 30 Oct 2026 16:45:26 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-113799
PublishedSlack Morphism is a client library for Slack Web/Events API/Socket Mode and Block Kit. Versions 1.0.0 through 2.27.0 expose the correct Slack request HMAC when signature verification fails. For an invalid request, `slack-morphism` computes the correct signature for the attacker-controlled timestamp and request body and stores it in `SlackEventWrongSignatureError.generated_hash`. The error's `Debug` and `Display` representations expose that value, and the default Axum listener error handler logs it at error level. An attacker who can both reach the application's Slack callback endpoint and read its application/service logs can therefore use the verifier as a chosen-message HMAC oracle. The attacker can send an arbitrary request with an invalid signature, recover the correct signature from the resulting log entry, and resend the same request within the five-minute freshness window. The second request passes Slack Morphism's signature verification and reaches the protected application callback without the attacker knowing the Slack signing secret. Version 2.28.0 patches the issue.
- Source published
- 21 Oct 2026 16:15:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Oct 2026 15:14:24 UTC
- Observed here
- 30 Oct 2026 16:45:26 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N