Echo: Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration
Historical advisory recorded 2 Nov 2026 21:57:16 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-118653
PublishedEcho is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 5.1.0, Context.RealIP falls back to client-supplied X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP values when Echo.IPExtractor is unset, and the default RateLimiter uses that result as its client identifier. A remote attacker can rotate arbitrary forwarded-address values to obtain new rate-limit buckets and bypass IP-based throttling used for controls such as brute-force or request-volume protection. This issue is fixed in Echo v5.1.0.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-118653
PublishedEcho: Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration
Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 5.1.0, Context.RealIP falls back to client-supplied X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP values when Echo.IPExtractor is unset, and the default RateLimiter uses that result as its client identifier. A remote attacker can rotate arbitrary forwarded-address values to obtain new rate-limit buckets and bypass IP-based throttling used for controls such as brute-force or request-volume protection. This issue is fixed in Echo v5.1.0.
- Source published
- 28 Oct 2026 19:42:05 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Nov 2026 20:41:49 UTC
- Saved here
- 2 Nov 2026 21:57:16 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N