SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.
## Summary
`SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk` reads the `numGapAckBlocks` and `numDuplicateTSNs` fields (each up to 65535) directly from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk and loops that many times reading 4 bytes per iteration, with no validation of the counts against the chunk length or the receive buffer. A single crafted SACK chunk from a negotiated WebRTC peer forces reads past the end of the 262144-byte receive buffer, raising `IndexOutOfRangeException`, which is not caught by the recoverable handler and terminates the dedicated SCTP receive thread — permanently killing the SCTP association and all data channels.
## Root Cause
`src/SIPSorcery/net/SCTP/Chunks/SctpSackChunk.cs`:
- `ushort numGapAckBlocks = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 8);` (:141)
- `ushort numDuplicateTSNs = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 10);` (:142)
- gap-ack loop (:146) and duplicate-TSN loop (:154) index the buffer via `NetConvert.ParseUInt16/32` (`buffer[posn]`, no bounds check — `sys/Net/NetConvert.cs:30,41`).
`SctpPacket.ParseChunks` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203) only validates `chunkLength >= 4` and `posn+chunkLength <= length`; the counts inside the value are never checked. `RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive` calls `SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead)` on a reused `recvBuffer = new byte[262144]`.
## Impact
`IndexOutOfRangeException` is a `SystemException`, not `ApplicationException`, so the recoverable `catch (ApplicationException) { … continue; }` at RTCSctpTransport.cs:345 is skipped and control falls to the generic `catch (Exception) { … break; }` at :356. The `break` exits the receive loop, `DoReceive` returns, and the dedicated `_receiveThread = new Thread(DoReceive)` (:173, started once) exits with no restart → the SCTP association and every data channel are permanently dead (denial of service).
## Proof of Concept
A negotiated WebRTC peer (post-DTLS) sends a checksum-valid SCTP packet: 12-byte common header + a SACK chunk (type 3) with `chunkLength=16`, `numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF`, `numDuplicateTSNs=0xFFFF`. CRC32C is attacker-computable. The gap-ack loop reaches `buffer[262144]` on a 262144-byte array (valid indices 0..262143) → `IndexOutOfRangeException`.
## Attack Chain
1. Entry: post-DTLS negotiated peer sends a checksum-valid SCTP packet with a SACK chunk (`chunkLength=16`, `numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF`). Guard: `VerifyChecksum` (CRC32C). Bypass: CRC32C is computable by the sender.
2. Processing: `DoReceive` (RTCSctpTransport.cs:286) reads into reused `recvBuffer` (262144 bytes, :280) → `SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead)` (:302) → `ParseChunks` → SACK dispatch (`SctpChunk.Parse` :340-341) → `SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk`. Guard: `ParseChunks` checks only `chunkLength>=4` and `posn+chunkLength<=length` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203). Bypass: `chunkLength=16` is well-formed; the counts are never validated.
3. Sink: gap-ack loop (SctpSackChunk.cs:146) calls `NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, reportPosn)` with `reportPosn` starting at `startPosn(16)+FIXED_PARAMETERS(12)=28`, climbing `+4` each iteration. Guard: none on the count. Bypass: `NetConvert.ParseUInt16` (NetConvert.cs:30) indexes `buffer[posn]` unchecked.
4. Impact: at iteration 65529, `reportPosn = 28 + 65529*4 = 262144` → `buffer[262144]` → `IndexOutOfRangeException` → generic `catch` at RTCSctpTransport.cs:356 → `break` → receive thread exits, no restart → association permanently dead.
## Bypass Evidence
- Unchecked counts at SctpSackChunk.cs:141-142; loops at :146,:154.
- `NetConvert.ParseUInt16` unchecked indexing (NetConvert.cs:30).
- `ParseChunks` validates only `chunkLength` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203).
- OOB math: `28 + 65535*4 = 262168 > 262144`; buffer is 262144 (`DEFAULT_ADVERTISED_RECEIVE_WINDOW`, SctpAssociation.cs:62). `numGapAckBlocks` alone suffices — the dup-TSN loop is not needed.
- `DoReceive` catch split: recoverable `catch(ApplicationException)` at :345 (`continue`) vs generic `catch(Exception)` at :356 (`break`); `_receiveThread` started once at :176.
## Affected Versions
`nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13` (verified present on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD da944543).
## Dedup
NOT a duplicate of GHSA-qmvg-569h-hqrh — that fix (`fe5a1fa`) touched only `SctpPacket.cs` (the chunk-cursor zero-length infinite loop, CWE-835). This is a distinct out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) in `SctpSackChunk` count loops, untouched by that fix.
## Suggested Fix
Validate `startPosn + FIXED_PARAMETERS_LENGTH + numGapAckBlocks*4 + numDuplicateTSNs*4 <= posn + chunkLen` before the loops, and/or make `NetConvert.Parse*` bounds-checked, and/or treat `IndexOutOfRangeException`/`ArgumentException` as recoverable in `DoReceive`.
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Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use
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CVE-2026-123805
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FIRST EPSS: 0.37 % · percentile 31.73 % · scored 18 Nov 2026.
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SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…
SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the correspond…