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gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 08:17:18 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2026-33186

Published

gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass resulting from improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present. This affects gRPC-Go servers that use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`; AND that have a security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule). The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server. The fix in version 1.79.3 ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string. While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods: Use a validating interceptor (recommended mitigation); infrastructure-level normalization; and/or policy hardening.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2026-33186

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-285 · CWE-551

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-03-20T23:16:45.180

lastModified: 2026-09-18T13:17:50.363

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:grpc:grpc:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 19 Nov 18:50 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current