An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. POST /v3/credentials did not validate that the caller-supplied project_id for an EC2-type credential matched the project of the authenticating application credential. This allowed an attacker holding an unrestricted application credential for project A to create an EC2 credential targeting project B; a subsequent /v3/ec2tokens exchange would then issue a Keystone token scoped to project B while still carrying the original app_cred_id, enabling cross-project lateral movement within the credential owner's role footprint.
See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.
How advisory history works
Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. POST /v3/credentials did not validate that the caller-supplied project_id for an EC2-type credential matched the project of the authenticating application credential. This allowed…