Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP packet on the RTP/ICE socket can remotely terminate a media session (DoS)

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by SIPSorcery 10.0.9KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-54632

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-78055

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-54632

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93

Published

### Impact A single malformed inbound UDP packet on the RTP/ICE socket can remotely terminate an active RTP or WebRTC media session. The packet receive handler indexes packet (and STUN attribute) bytes without sufficient length checks and throws, and the UDP receive loop converted any such exception into a channel `Close` rather than dropping the packet. One small, unauthenticated packet therefore ends the media session. This is reachable during ICE connectivity checks — before the DTLS handshake and before any STUN `MESSAGE-INTEGRITY` verification. Because the RTP/ICE port is shared/advertised in the ICE candidates, a peer or on-path attacker can reach it (exposure is lower for a blind off-path attacker that must first learn the ephemeral port). Impact is availability only — no loss of confidentiality or integrity. ### Affected versions NuGet package `SIPSorcery` `<= 10.0.8`. ### Patches Fixed in `10.0.9`. ### Root cause Two issues combine: 1. **Unchecked indexing of untrusted bytes.** - `RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived` read `packet[1]` after only checking the packet was non-empty, so a 1-byte packet threw `IndexOutOfRangeException`. - `STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes` passed a `null`/short value to the typed attribute parsers, and `STUNXORAddressAttribute` (and the non-XOR `STUNAddressAttribute`) then read `attributeValue[1]`, `AsSpan(2)` and `AsSpan(4)` with no length check. A STUN message carrying an `XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS`, `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` or `XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS` attribute of length 0–7 threw (`NullReferenceException` for length 0, `IndexOutOfRangeException`/`ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for 1–7). 2. **The UDP receive loop closed the channel on any exception.** The catch-all in `UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom` called `Close()`, tearing down the channel, instead of dropping the offending packet and continuing. This was systemic: any unhandled exception anywhere in the packet pipeline (STUN, RTP, RTCP, DTLS demux, SRTP, TURN) became a channel teardown. ### Fix - `UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom`: a non-socket exception now logs and drops the single packet and re-arms the receive loop (matching the existing `SIPUDPChannel` behaviour), instead of closing the channel. Genuine socket failures continue to be handled separately. - `RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived`: requires a minimum packet length (`RTPHeader.MIN_HEADER_LEN`) before indexing the discriminator bytes. - STUN parsing: `ParseMessageAttributes` validates each attribute value length and skips malformed/truncated attributes; the XOR/address attribute constructors validate length defensively; `ParseSTUNMessage` no longer dereferences a null attribute list. Regression tests were added covering the 1-byte packet (channel stays open and remains usable), short/zero-length XOR address attributes (0–7 bytes), and truncated STUN messages. ### Workarounds None within the library short of upgrading. Restricting the RTP/ICE port to known peers at the network layer reduces exposure but does not eliminate it, since a negotiating peer can still trigger the condition. ### Credit Responsibly reported by Lokhesh Ujhoodha.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

CVE-2026-54632

This is a saved version of the risk data. The advisory details have their own history. Latest risk data.

No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.

FIRST EPSS: 0.72 % · percentile 54.08 % · scored 7 Nov 2026. This score is more than two days old.

Saved 07 Nov 2026 16:07:52 UTC · View this risk record (JSON)

cve-program · CVE-2026-54632

Published

SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP packet on the RTP/ICE socket can remotely terminate a media session (DoS)

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Source published
14 Sep 2026 19:58:30 UTC
Source modified
15 Sep 2026 14:43:28 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-78055

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted byte…

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 14, 2026, 7:58:30 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 15, 2026, 2:43:28 PM

Source published
Sep 14, 2026, 7:58:30 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 15, 2026, 2:43:28 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 15:49:28 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-54632

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted byte…

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.9, RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived and the STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes, STUNXORAddressAttribute, and STUNAddressAttribute parsing path index untrusted bytes without sufficient length checks, while UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom closes the channel when those operations raise a non-socket exception. A remote party can send a single short RTP packet or malformed zero-to-seven-byte STUN address attribute to the shared RTP/ICE socket, including during ICE connectivity checks before DTLS or STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY verification, and terminate the active RTP or WebRTC media session. The attacker must reach or learn the advertised ephemeral RTP/ICE port, but no authentication or user interaction is required, and the impact is limited to availability. This issue is fixed in version 10.0.9.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-755

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-14T20:16:47.010

lastModified: 2026-09-30T17:51:56.193

Source published
14 Sep 2026 20:16:47 UTC
Source modified
30 Sep 2026 17:51:56 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93

Published

SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP packet on the RTP/ICE socket can remotely terminate a media session (DoS)

### Impact A single malformed inbound UDP packet on the RTP/ICE socket can remotely terminate an active RTP or WebRTC media session. The packet receive handler indexes packet (and STUN attribute) bytes without sufficient length checks and throws, and the UDP receive loop converted any such exception into a channel `Close` rather than dropping the packet. One small, unauthenticated packet therefore ends the media session. This is reachable during ICE connectivity checks — before the DTLS handshake and before any STUN `MESSAGE-INTEGRITY` verification. Because the RTP/ICE port is shared/advertised in the ICE candidates, a peer or on-path attacker can reach it (exposure is lower for a blind off-path attacker that must first learn the ephemeral port). Impact is availability only — no loss of confidentiality or integrity. ### Affected versions NuGet package `SIPSorcery` `<= 10.0.8`. ### Patches Fixed in `10.0.9`. ### Root cause Two issues combine: 1. **Unchecked indexing of untrusted bytes.** - `RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived` read `packet[1]` after only checking the packet was non-empty, so a 1-byte packet threw `IndexOutOfRangeException`. - `STUNAttribute.ParseMessageAttributes` passed a `null`/short value to the typed attribute parsers, and `STUNXORAddressAttribute` (and the non-XOR `STUNAddressAttribute`) then read `attributeValue[1]`, `AsSpan(2)` and `AsSpan(4)` with no length check. A STUN message carrying an `XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS`, `XOR-PEER-ADDRESS` or `XOR-RELAYED-ADDRESS` attribute of length 0–7 threw (`NullReferenceException` for length 0, `IndexOutOfRangeException`/`ArgumentOutOfRangeException` for 1–7). 2. **The UDP receive loop closed the channel on any exception.** The catch-all in `UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom` called `Close()`, tearing down the channel, instead of dropping the offending packet and continuing. This was systemic: any unhandled exception anywhere in the packet pipeline (STUN, RTP, RTCP, DTLS demux, SRTP, TURN) became a channel teardown. ### Fix - `UdpReceiver.EndReceiveFrom`: a non-socket exception now logs and drops the single packet and re-arms the receive loop (matching the existing `SIPUDPChannel` behaviour), instead of closing the channel. Genuine socket failures continue to be handled separately. - `RTPChannel.OnRTPPacketReceived`: requires a minimum packet length (`RTPHeader.MIN_HEADER_LEN`) before indexing the discriminator bytes. - STUN parsing: `ParseMessageAttributes` validates each attribute value length and skips malformed/truncated attributes; the XOR/address attribute constructors validate length defensively; `ParseSTUNMessage` no longer dereferences a null attribute list. Regression tests were added covering the 1-byte packet (channel stays open and remains usable), short/zero-length XOR address attributes (0–7 bytes), and truncated STUN messages. ### Workarounds None within the library short of upgrading. Restricting the RTP/ICE port to known peers at the network layer reduces exposure but does not eliminate it, since a negotiating peer can still trigger the condition. ### Credit Responsibly reported by Lokhesh Ujhoodha.

Source published
28 Jul 2026 17:01:19 UTC
Source modified
28 Jul 2026 17:26:50 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 16:01:25 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 10:01 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 252 fully read · 18 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current