OpenEXR: Integer overflow and uninitialized pointer cause invalid delete in OpenEXRUtil image resize
Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-54920
PublishedOpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, a reachable assertion failure in the HTJ2K decode path allows a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file to cause an unconditional process abort in any application that calls exr_start_read() on untrusted input, resulting in denial of service. The crash is triggered by a QCD marker whose lower five bits are zero, which OpenEXR passes into the vendored OpenJPH library while constructing the codestream and evaluating its quantization delta parameters. OpenJPH uses an assertion rather than a recoverable error to validate those bits, so any invalid value calls abort() directly and cannot be intercepted by surrounding error handling, a problem compounded by OpenEXR wrapping only its internal HT header parser in error handling while leaving the later codestream read and construction calls unprotected. This issue has been resolved in version 3.4.13.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
cve-program · CVE-2026-54920
PublishedOpenEXR: Integer overflow and uninitialized pointer cause invalid delete in OpenEXRUtil image resize
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.12, a reachable assertion failure in the HTJ2K decode path allows a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file to cause an unconditional process abort in any application that calls exr_start_read() on untrusted input, resulting in denial of service. The crash is triggered by a QCD marker whose lower five bits are zero, which OpenEXR passes into the vendored OpenJPH library while constructing the codestream and evaluating its quantization delta parameters. OpenJPH uses an assertion rather than a recoverable error to validate those bits, so any invalid value calls abort() directly and cannot be intercepted by surrounding error handling, a problem compounded by OpenEXR wrapping only its internal HT header parser in error handling while leaving the later codestream read and construction calls unprotected. This issue has been resolved in version 3.4.13.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 00:10:39 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Aug 2026 15:17:34 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 0.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N