Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph…
Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
nvd · CVE-2026-59160
PublishedYeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
nvd · CVE-2026-59160
PublishedYeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, …
Yeger is a monorepo for npm packages maintained under the yeger scope. Prior to 2.8.9, the turbo-graph package starts its embedded Next.js server from packages/turbo-graph/src/index.ts on all interfaces, including 0.0.0.0:29312 by default, while the GET handler for /api/run in packages/turbo-graph-ui/app/api/run/route.ts has no authentication, authorization, CSRF protection, or task allowlist. The handler accepts the tasks, filter, and force query parameters, and buildResponseFromArgs passes attacker-selected task names to spawn() as Turbo CLI arguments. An adjacent-network attacker can execute any task defined in the victim repository's turbo.json with the privileges of the developer OS user, potentially exposing secrets, modifying files or infrastructure, or causing destructive availability effects. The use of an argument array prevents traditional shell metacharacter injection but does not prevent unauthorized execution of defined tasks. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.9.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-306
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-15T17:17:23.410
lastModified: 2026-09-30T17:51:56.193
- Source published
- 15 Sep 2026 17:17:23 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Sep 2026 17:51:56 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H