Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}
Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-62993
PublishedSmarty is a template engine for PHP, facilitating the separation of presentation (HTML/CSS) from application logic. Prior to 4.5.7 and 5.8.2, depending on the release line, Smarty's {fetch} handling in libs/plugins/function.fetch.php and src/FunctionHandler/Fetch.php used Security::isTrustedUri() to validate only the initial remote URL against trusted_uri when a security policy was active. For resources handled by file_get_contents(), including HTTPS URLs, PHP followed HTTP redirects by default. An attacker who could supply or influence a fetch target and had an open redirect on a trusted host could redirect the request to an attacker-chosen internal endpoint, bypass the trusted_uri allowlist, and perform server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in versions 4.5.7 and 5.8.2.
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CVE-2026-62993 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-62993
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/security/advisories/GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/pull/1194
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/commit/31e06fc087a8b5a9b236c1e5dacc1c2850a2c115
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/commit/a1ccdb0518021a559b4066c37b76a42c86bbce90
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/releases/tag/v4.5.7
- https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/releases/tag/v5.8.2
This historical advisory does not include today's related changes. Open the latest advisory to find current connections.