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io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops

CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

cve-program · CVE-2026-72112

Published

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side (ctx->bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops->priv unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring via fget(ops->ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE calls. The second registration passes the ctx->bpf_ops check (the new ctx has none) and overwrites ops->priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown (io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops->priv, so the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx->loop_step keeps pointing into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling ctx->loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON. Reject registration when ops->priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg() does for its struct_ops.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-72112

Published

io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side (ctx->bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops->priv unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring via fget(ops->ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE calls. The second registration passes the ctx->bpf_ops check (the new ctx has none) and overwrites ops->priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown (io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops->priv, so the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx->loop_step keeps pointing into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling ctx->loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON. Reject registration when ops->priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg() does for its struct_ops.

Source published
15 Aug 2026 05:52:53 UTC
Source modified
17 Aug 2026 05:40:26 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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Sources read 21 Nov 22:34 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current