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Scriban before 7.0.0 Uncontrolled Recursion via object.to_json

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by Scriban 7.0.0Fixed by Scriban.Signed 7.0.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-74787

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-59953

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-74787

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5

Published

## Summary The `object.to_json` builtin function in Scriban performs recursive JSON serialization via an internal `WriteValue()` static local function that has no depth limit, no circular reference detection, and no stack overflow guard. A Scriban template containing a self-referencing object passed to `object.to_json` triggers unbounded recursion, causing a `StackOverflowException` that terminates the hosting .NET process. This is a fatal, unrecoverable crash — `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by user code in .NET. ## Details The vulnerable code is the `WriteValue()` static local function at `src/Scriban/Functions/ObjectFunctions.cs:494`: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value) { var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object); if (value is null || value is string || value is bool || type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable) { JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type); } else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) { writer.WriteStartArray(); foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value)) { WriteValue(context, writer, x); // recursive, no depth check } writer.WriteEndArray(); } else { writer.WriteStartObject(); var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value); foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value)) { if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue)) { writer.WritePropertyName(member); WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue); // recursive, no depth check } } writer.WriteEndObject(); } } ``` This function has **none** of the safety mechanisms present in other recursive paths: - `ObjectToString()` at `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:98` checks `ObjectRecursionLimit` (default 20) - `EnterRecursive()` at `TemplateContext.cs:957` calls `RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` - `CheckAbort()` at `TemplateContext.cs:464` also calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` The `WriteValue()` function bypasses all of these because it is a static local function that only takes the `TemplateContext` for member access — it never calls `EnterRecursive()`, never checks `ObjectRecursionLimit`, and never calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()`. **Execution flow:** 1. Template creates a ScriptObject: `{{ x = {} }}` 2. Sets a self-reference: `x.self = x` — stores a reference in `ScriptObject.Store` dictionary 3. Pipes to `object.to_json`: `x | object.to_json` → calls `ToJson()` at line 477 4. `ToJson()` calls `WriteValue(context, writer, value)` at line 488 5. `WriteValue` enters the `else` branch (line 515), gets members via accessor, finds "self" 6. `TryGetValue` returns `x` itself, `WriteValue` recurses with the same object — infinite loop 7. `StackOverflowException` is thrown — **fatal, cannot be caught, process terminates** ## PoC ```scriban {{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }} ``` In a hosting application: ```csharp using Scriban; // This will crash the entire process with StackOverflowException var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}"); var result = template.Render(); // FATAL: process terminates here ``` Even without circular references, deeply nested objects can exhaust the stack since no depth limit is enforced: ```scriban {{ a = {} b = {inner: a} c = {inner: b} d = {inner: c} # ... continue nesting ... result = deepest | object.to_json }} ``` ## Impact - **Process crash DoS**: Any application embedding Scriban for user-provided templates (CMS platforms, email template engines, report generators, static site generators) can be crashed by a single malicious template. The crash is unrecoverable — `StackOverflowException` terminates the .NET process. - **No try/catch protection possible**: Unlike most exceptions, `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by application code. The hosting application cannot wrap `template.Render()` in a try/catch to survive this. - **No authentication required**: `object.to_json` is a default builtin function (registered in `BuiltinFunctions.cs`), available in all Scriban templates unless explicitly removed. - **Trivial to exploit**: The PoC is a single line of template code. ## Recommended Fix Add a depth counter parameter to `WriteValue()` and check it against `ObjectRecursionLimit`, consistent with how `ObjectToString` is protected. Also add `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` as a safety net: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value, int depth = 0) { if (context.ObjectRecursionLimit != 0 && depth > context.ObjectRecursionLimit) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan, $"Exceeding object recursion limit `{context.ObjectRecursionLimit}` in object.to_json"); } try { RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack(); } catch (InsufficientExecutionStackException) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan, "Exceeding recursive depth limit in object.to_json, near to stack overflow"); } var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object); if (value is null || value is string || value is bool || type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable) { JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type); } else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) { writer.WriteStartArray(); foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value)) { WriteValue(context, writer, x, depth + 1); } writer.WriteEndArray(); } else { writer.WriteStartObject(); var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value); foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value)) { if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue)) { writer.WritePropertyName(member); WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue, depth + 1); } } writer.WriteEndObject(); } } ```

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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CVE-2026-74787

This is a saved version of the risk data. The advisory details have their own history. Latest risk data.

No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.

FIRST EPSS: 0.49 % · percentile 42.19 % · scored 6 Nov 2026. This score is more than two days old.

Saved 06 Nov 2026 19:10:17 UTC · View this risk record (JSON)

cve-program · CVE-2026-74787

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 Uncontrolled Recursion via object.to_json

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Source published
16 Aug 2026 13:14:12 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 14:07:14 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-59953

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger un…

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 16, 2026, 1:14:12 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 18, 2026, 2:07:14 PM

Source published
Aug 16, 2026, 1:14:12 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 18, 2026, 2:07:14 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 18:38:32 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-74787

Published

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger un…

Scriban before 7.0.0 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the object.to_json builtin function that lacks depth limits and circular reference detection. Attackers can craft templates with self-referencing objects to trigger unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that fatally terminates the hosting .NET process.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-674

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-16T14:16:56.653

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:32:39.347

Source published
16 Aug 2026 14:16:56 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:32:39 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:19:09 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5

Published

Scriban has Uncontrolled Recursion in `object.to_json` Causing Unrecoverable Process Crash via StackOverflowException

## Summary The `object.to_json` builtin function in Scriban performs recursive JSON serialization via an internal `WriteValue()` static local function that has no depth limit, no circular reference detection, and no stack overflow guard. A Scriban template containing a self-referencing object passed to `object.to_json` triggers unbounded recursion, causing a `StackOverflowException` that terminates the hosting .NET process. This is a fatal, unrecoverable crash — `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by user code in .NET. ## Details The vulnerable code is the `WriteValue()` static local function at `src/Scriban/Functions/ObjectFunctions.cs:494`: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value) { var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object); if (value is null || value is string || value is bool || type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable) { JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type); } else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) { writer.WriteStartArray(); foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value)) { WriteValue(context, writer, x); // recursive, no depth check } writer.WriteEndArray(); } else { writer.WriteStartObject(); var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value); foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value)) { if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue)) { writer.WritePropertyName(member); WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue); // recursive, no depth check } } writer.WriteEndObject(); } } ``` This function has **none** of the safety mechanisms present in other recursive paths: - `ObjectToString()` at `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:98` checks `ObjectRecursionLimit` (default 20) - `EnterRecursive()` at `TemplateContext.cs:957` calls `RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` - `CheckAbort()` at `TemplateContext.cs:464` also calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` The `WriteValue()` function bypasses all of these because it is a static local function that only takes the `TemplateContext` for member access — it never calls `EnterRecursive()`, never checks `ObjectRecursionLimit`, and never calls `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()`. **Execution flow:** 1. Template creates a ScriptObject: `{{ x = {} }}` 2. Sets a self-reference: `x.self = x` — stores a reference in `ScriptObject.Store` dictionary 3. Pipes to `object.to_json`: `x | object.to_json` → calls `ToJson()` at line 477 4. `ToJson()` calls `WriteValue(context, writer, value)` at line 488 5. `WriteValue` enters the `else` branch (line 515), gets members via accessor, finds "self" 6. `TryGetValue` returns `x` itself, `WriteValue` recurses with the same object — infinite loop 7. `StackOverflowException` is thrown — **fatal, cannot be caught, process terminates** ## PoC ```scriban {{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }} ``` In a hosting application: ```csharp using Scriban; // This will crash the entire process with StackOverflowException var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}"); var result = template.Render(); // FATAL: process terminates here ``` Even without circular references, deeply nested objects can exhaust the stack since no depth limit is enforced: ```scriban {{ a = {} b = {inner: a} c = {inner: b} d = {inner: c} # ... continue nesting ... result = deepest | object.to_json }} ``` ## Impact - **Process crash DoS**: Any application embedding Scriban for user-provided templates (CMS platforms, email template engines, report generators, static site generators) can be crashed by a single malicious template. The crash is unrecoverable — `StackOverflowException` terminates the .NET process. - **No try/catch protection possible**: Unlike most exceptions, `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by application code. The hosting application cannot wrap `template.Render()` in a try/catch to survive this. - **No authentication required**: `object.to_json` is a default builtin function (registered in `BuiltinFunctions.cs`), available in all Scriban templates unless explicitly removed. - **Trivial to exploit**: The PoC is a single line of template code. ## Recommended Fix Add a depth counter parameter to `WriteValue()` and check it against `ObjectRecursionLimit`, consistent with how `ObjectToString` is protected. Also add `EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()` as a safety net: ```csharp static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value, int depth = 0) { if (context.ObjectRecursionLimit != 0 && depth > context.ObjectRecursionLimit) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan, $"Exceeding object recursion limit `{context.ObjectRecursionLimit}` in object.to_json"); } try { RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack(); } catch (InsufficientExecutionStackException) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan, "Exceeding recursive depth limit in object.to_json, near to stack overflow"); } var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object); if (value is null || value is string || value is bool || type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable) { JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type); } else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) { writer.WriteStartArray(); foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value)) { WriteValue(context, writer, x, depth + 1); } writer.WriteEndArray(); } else { writer.WriteStartObject(); var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value); foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value)) { if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue)) { writer.WritePropertyName(member); WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue, depth + 1); } } writer.WriteEndObject(); } } ```

Source published
24 Mar 2026 22:15:13 UTC
Source modified
17 Aug 2026 03:55:58 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 16:01:25 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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