Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession
Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-81868
PublishedSteeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.
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CVE-2026-81868 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-81868
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