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Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession

CVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate 4.3.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-81868

Published

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-81899

Published

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-81868

Published

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9

Published

### Summary When Steeltoe's certificate-based authorization (`UseCertificateAuthorization`) is configured, the default configuration of the middleware relies on the `X-Client-Cert` HTTP header to identify the client certificate, without verifying private-key possession. This header is not stripped by common Cloud Foundry routers (like Gorouter or Envoy) on inbound requests. ### Impact An attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space can spoof the `X-Client-Cert` header. This allows the attacker to bypass `SameOrg` and `SameSpace` authorization policies, granting unauthorized access to protected endpoints for the duration of the certificate's validity period. ### Affected configuration - The application uses `AddOrgAndSpacePolicies()` and `UseCertificateAuthorization()` for inter-service authorization. - Inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP. - The application's endpoints are network-accessible to the attacker (e.g., exposed to the internet via a public Cloud Foundry route, or the attacker has access to the internal Cloud Foundry network). ### Mitigations If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible: - Restrict `UseCertificateForwarding` to trusted proxy source IPs using `ForwardedHeadersOptions.KnownProxies` and `KnownNetworks`. - Change the forwarding header to `X-Forwarded-Client-Cert` so that Cloud Foundry Gorouter and Envoy header stripping mechanisms apply to inbound untrusted requests. - Add a secondary authorization layer (e.g., a shared secret or mutual TLS at the proxy layer) for sensitive endpoints. - Ensure the application is not bound to a public route unless explicitly required. Use Cloud Foundry internal routes (e.g., `.apps.internal`) and container-to-container network policies to strictly limit network access to intended internal clients.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-81868

Published

security-advisories

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "SteeltoeOSS",
                    "product": "security-advisories",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 4.3.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-81899

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 17, 2026, 3:36:23 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 23, 2026, 6:46:54 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-81868

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis

Weakness classifications: CWE-288 · CWE-295

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-17T16:17:47.607

lastModified: 2026-09-30T17:31:44.573

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9

Published

Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate

NuGet

ECOSYSTEM · introduced 0 → fixed 4.3.0

5 versions listed as affected

4.0.0, 4.0.0-beta1, 4.0.0-rc1, 4.1.0, 4.2.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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