gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.
How advisory history works
Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.
gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted …