The Approval app's approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file's current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced this check when the etag parameter was present and non-empty in the request. An attacker able to intercept and modify the approval request could omit the etag field entirely, bypassing the freshness check and approving or rejecting a file version they never reviewed.
See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.
How advisory history works
Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.
The Approval app's approve/reject endpoint is meant to require the file's current etag as a freshness check, preventing an approver from approving or rejecting a file whose contents changed after they reviewed it. The backend only enforced …