libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses
cve-program · CVE-2026-86039 · Published
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Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. From 8.0.0 until 12.0.24, @libp2p/peer-store in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts uses consumePeerRecord to verify a RecordEnvelope signature but does not require PeerRecord.peerId in the signed payload to equal the signer peer ID derived by RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify. The expectedPeer option checks only the envelope signer, and the gossipsub Peer Exchange path can provide the attacker's own peer ID as expectedPeer. An attacker can therefore sign a record with the attacker's key, place a victim peer ID and attacker-controlled multiaddrs in the payload, and have certified addresses stored for the victim. The poisoned addresses can cause address-book corruption, dial redirection or failure, routing manipulation, and reachability disruption, although the connection upgrade still verifies remote peer identity and prevents a complete identity takeover. The issue is fixed in version 12.0.24.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-86039 · Published
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