Building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause arbitrary code execution at build time through several compiler and linker flags permitted in "#cgo" directives. Specifically, "--sysroot" in GCC and Clang relocates compiler subprograms, spec files, and CRT startup objects to an attacker-controlled directory; "-target" in Clang falls back to executing target helper tools from the current working directory when not found in PATH; "-isysroot" and "-Wl,-syslibroot" can pass a regular file on disk to GNU ld.bfd, which interprets it as a positional linker script; and "-x" permitted specifying arbitrary compiler input languages beyond those supported by cgo. "--sysroot" and "-target" are now disallowed in "#cgo" flags, "-isysroot" and "-Wl,-syslibroot" are verified not to point to regular files, and "-x" is restricted to the C, C++, Objective-C, and assembler languages supported by cgo.
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Building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause arbitrary code execution at build time through several compiler and linker flags permitted in "#cgo" directives. Specifically, "--sysroot" in GCC and Clang relocates compiler subprogram…