In OpenStack Zaqar before 22.0.2, WSGI transport mishandles the URL-Signature header. By sending a request with an empty URL-Signature header, an unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target project's UUID may bypass both Keystone authentication and pre-signed URL verification, resulting in the ability to read, enumerate, create, and delete that project's queues, messages, claims, and subscriptions. By additionally claiming an administrative role, the attacker may also perform administrative operations, such as managing pools and flavors in admin_mode deployments. Only deployments using the WSGI transport with an authentication strategy configured are affected; the websocket transport is not affected.
See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.
How advisory history works
Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.
In OpenStack Zaqar before 22.0.2, WSGI transport mishandles the URL-Signature header. By sending a request with an empty URL-Signature header, an unauthenticated remote attacker who knows a target project's UUID may bypass both Keystone aut…