drm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state()
Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-97496
PublishedIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state() The get_wave_state() function for v9 trusts cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset values read directly from the MQD, which are written by GPU microcode and fully attacker-controlled on the CRIU-restore path (via AMDKFD_IOC_RESTORE_PROCESS with H3). this leads to an unbounded copy_to_user() that can leak adjacent GTT/kernel memory. If offset > size, integer underflow produces a ~4 GiB read length, if size is set to 1 MiB against a 4 KiB allocation, we leak 1 MiB of adjacent kernel memory (other queues' MQDs, ring buffers, KASLR pointers). Fix by clamping both cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size to the actual allocated buffer size (q->ctl_stack_size) and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset to the clamped size before performing arithmetic and copy_to_user(). This ensures we never read beyond the allocated kernel BO regardless of attacker-supplied MQD field values.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-97496
Publisheddrm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix OOB memory exposure in get_wave_state() The get_wave_state() function for v9 trusts cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset values read directly from the MQD, which are written by GPU microcode and fully attacker-controlled on the CRIU-restore path (via AMDKFD_IOC_RESTORE_PROCESS with H3). this leads to an unbounded copy_to_user() that can leak adjacent GTT/kernel memory. If offset > size, integer underflow produces a ~4 GiB read length, if size is set to 1 MiB against a 4 KiB allocation, we leak 1 MiB of adjacent kernel memory (other queues' MQDs, ring buffers, KASLR pointers). Fix by clamping both cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size to the actual allocated buffer size (q->ctl_stack_size) and cp_hqd_cntl_stack_offset to the clamped size before performing arithmetic and copy_to_user(). This ensures we never read beyond the allocated kernel BO regardless of attacker-supplied MQD field values.
- Source published
- 24 Sep 2026 16:04:43 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Oct 2026 10:58:59 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H