Passkey (FIDO2) authentication method
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title: Passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID
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description: Learn about using passkey (FIDO2) authentication in Microsoft Entra ID to help improve and secure sign-in events
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ms.topic: concept-article
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−ms.date: 02/02/2026
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+ms.date: 11/10/2026
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ms.reviewer: kimhana
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−ms.custom: sfi-image-nochange
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+ms.custom: sfi-image-nochange, msecd-doc-authoring-108
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+author: tilarso
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+ms.author: tilarso
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+ai-usage: ai-assisted
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# Customer intent: As an identity administrator, I want to understand how to use passkey (FIDO2) authentication in Microsoft Entra ID to improve and secure user sign-in events.
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---
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Regardless of type—device-bound or synced—passkeys represent a significant security upgrade over phishable MFA methods.
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For more details, see [Get started with phishing-resistant MFA deployment in Microsoft Entra ID](how-to-plan-prerequisites-phishing-resistant-passwordless-authentication.md).
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+<a id="credential-provenance"></a>
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+
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+## Credential provenance (preview)
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+Credential provenance records how a passkey was established, including its relationship to identity verification at registration. It's separate from the user's current account verification status and from passkey device or provider attestation.
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+> [!NOTE]
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+> During preview, credential provenance and credential assurance classification are available only for passkeys. Status and provenance reporting don't provide credential-provenance policy enforcement.
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+An account can have passkeys with different provenance. Review the passkey involved in an operation rather than treating every credential on the account as equivalent.
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+On the user's **Authentication methods** page, select a passkey to open its details. The details show **Credential assurance**, registration history, and **Credential provenance** for that credential. A visible assurance label doesn't prove a successful verification ceremony.
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+The following illustrative example shows **Employee ID** under **Verified with** and **Temporary Access Pass** under **Derived from**. These edited example values aren't evidence of a live verification or registration event.
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+:::image type="content" source="media/concept-authentication-passkeys-fido2/passkey-credential-provenance.png" alt-text="Illustrative screenshot of John Doe's passkey details showing High assurance, Employee ID under Verified with, and Temporary Access Pass under Derived from." lightbox="media/concept-authentication-passkeys-fido2/passkey-credential-provenance.png":::
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+The user's separate **Identity verification** page shows account-level verification status and history. It isn't part of the authentication method details.
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+Administrators can overwrite credential provenance. An administrative overwrite is separate from the user completing identity verification and doesn't prove a successful verification ceremony. For administrative operations and entitlements, see [Manage identity verification for a user](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#manage-identity-verification-for-a-user) and [Identity verification licensing](../../fundamentals/licensing.md#identity-verification).
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+Usability is separate from assurance. Method details retain assurance information for an unusable method so that an administrator can investigate it. A displayed assurance label doesn't establish that the passkey can currently sign in or that an access policy will grant access.
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+If provenance information is missing, don't infer that identity verification succeeded or failed. Check whether the credential and registration path are supported. Missing information isn't the same as a recorded change to a credential's trust context.
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+For account-level records, see [Identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history). For reporting entitlements, see [Identity verification licensing](../../fundamentals/licensing.md#identity-verification). For investigation guidance, see [Identity verification reporting](howto-authentication-methods-activity.md#identity-verification-reporting).
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+### Credential assurance classification (preview)
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+Credential assurance describes how a passkey is tied to identity verification. Review the classification of the individual passkey rather than treating every credential on a verified account as equivalent.
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+| Classification | Meaning for passkeys during preview |
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+| --- | --- |
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+| **High** | A new passkey is registered through an identity-verified registration journey. Its provenance records identity verification and an intact chain of trust. |
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+| **Medium** | An existing passkey is used in conjunction with identity verification, rather than a new passkey being registered in the identity-verified journey. |
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+| **Low** | No identity-verification provenance is recorded for the passkey, or its recorded chain of trust is broken. |
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+Using an existing passkey with identity verification results in **Medium** assurance. It isn't the same as registering a new **High** assurance passkey through an identity-verified journey.
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+During preview, this classification and credential provenance apply only to passkeys. An absent classification for another authentication method doesn't establish **Low** assurance. Account-level [identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history) are separate from the classification of a particular passkey.
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+Assurance classification is also separate from device or provider attestation, method usability, and the outcome of a Conditional Access policy. A **High** label doesn't by itself grant access.
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+### Credential assurance lifecycle
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+A passkey's assurance can change when its supporting identity verification changes. Expiration or invalidation lowers **High** or **Medium** assurance to **Low**. Successful reverification restores the affected passkey's previous assurance level. These changes apply only to passkeys whose provenance relies on that verification, not every passkey on the account.
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+Use the following table to distinguish identity verification from credential registration and later changes to trust:
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+| Event or journey | Effect on passkey assurance |
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+| --- | --- |
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+| Identity verification with an existing passkey. | The existing passkey used with identity verification has **Medium** assurance. This isn't a new identity-verified passkey registration. |
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+| New passkey registration through an identity-verified registration journey. | The new passkey has **High** assurance when its provenance records identity verification and an intact chain of trust. |
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+| Identity-verified onboarding with new passkey registration. | The new passkey has **High** assurance when registered through the supported identity-verified journey. Completing identity verification alone doesn't establish that passkey registration finished. |
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+| Identity-verified recovery with replacement passkey registration. | The replacement passkey has **High** assurance when registered through the supported identity-verified journey. Verification history on the account and provenance on the replacement passkey are separate records. |
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+| Supporting identity verification expires. | Affected **High** and **Medium** assurance passkeys become **Low**. A historical successful verification event doesn't establish that the supporting verification is still valid. |
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+| Supporting identity verification is invalidated. | Affected **High** and **Medium** assurance passkeys become **Low**. Review the current verification state as well as the passkey's provenance and classification. |
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+| The user completes reverification. | A previously **High** assurance passkey returns to **High** without new passkey registration. A previously **Medium** assurance passkey returns to **Medium**, not **High**. |
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+Review individual passkeys after each change. Don't assume that verifying an account gives every existing passkey **High** assurance, or that a change in assurance means a passkey is unusable. For the account-level evidence, see [Identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history).
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+<!-- TODO: Validate method-detail labels, displayed properties, minimum permissions, supported registration paths, and visibility on preexisting passkeys. Don't infer backfill or automatic upgrades from proposed chain-of-trust schemas. -->
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## Related content
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