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Passkey (FIDO2) authentication method

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Publish Ignite 2026 High Assurance documentation release (#15002)

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22 title: Passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method in Microsoft Entra ID
33 description: Learn about using passkey (FIDO2) authentication in Microsoft Entra ID to help improve and secure sign-in events
44 ms.topic: concept-article
5 −ms.date: 02/02/2026
5 +ms.date: 11/10/2026
66 ms.reviewer: kimhana
7 −ms.custom: sfi-image-nochange
7 +ms.custom: sfi-image-nochange, msecd-doc-authoring-108
8 +author: tilarso
9 +ms.author: tilarso
10 +ai-usage: ai-assisted
811 # Customer intent: As an identity administrator, I want to understand how to use passkey (FIDO2) authentication in Microsoft Entra ID to improve and secure user sign-in events.
912 ---
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7376 Regardless of type—device-bound or synced—passkeys represent a significant security upgrade over phishable MFA methods.
7477
7578 For more details, see [Get started with phishing-resistant MFA deployment in Microsoft Entra ID](how-to-plan-prerequisites-phishing-resistant-passwordless-authentication.md).
79 +
80 +<a id="credential-provenance"></a>
81 +
82 +## Credential provenance (preview)
83 +
84 +Credential provenance records how a passkey was established, including its relationship to identity verification at registration. It's separate from the user's current account verification status and from passkey device or provider attestation.
85 +
86 +> [!NOTE]
87 +> During preview, credential provenance and credential assurance classification are available only for passkeys. Status and provenance reporting don't provide credential-provenance policy enforcement.
88 +
89 +An account can have passkeys with different provenance. Review the passkey involved in an operation rather than treating every credential on the account as equivalent.
90 +
91 +On the user's **Authentication methods** page, select a passkey to open its details. The details show **Credential assurance**, registration history, and **Credential provenance** for that credential. A visible assurance label doesn't prove a successful verification ceremony.
92 +
93 +The following illustrative example shows **Employee ID** under **Verified with** and **Temporary Access Pass** under **Derived from**. These edited example values aren't evidence of a live verification or registration event.
94 +
95 +:::image type="content" source="media/concept-authentication-passkeys-fido2/passkey-credential-provenance.png" alt-text="Illustrative screenshot of John Doe's passkey details showing High assurance, Employee ID under Verified with, and Temporary Access Pass under Derived from." lightbox="media/concept-authentication-passkeys-fido2/passkey-credential-provenance.png":::
96 +
97 +The user's separate **Identity verification** page shows account-level verification status and history. It isn't part of the authentication method details.
98 +
99 +Administrators can overwrite credential provenance. An administrative overwrite is separate from the user completing identity verification and doesn't prove a successful verification ceremony. For administrative operations and entitlements, see [Manage identity verification for a user](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#manage-identity-verification-for-a-user) and [Identity verification licensing](../../fundamentals/licensing.md#identity-verification).
100 +
101 +Usability is separate from assurance. Method details retain assurance information for an unusable method so that an administrator can investigate it. A displayed assurance label doesn't establish that the passkey can currently sign in or that an access policy will grant access.
102 +
103 +If provenance information is missing, don't infer that identity verification succeeded or failed. Check whether the credential and registration path are supported. Missing information isn't the same as a recorded change to a credential's trust context.
104 +
105 +For account-level records, see [Identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history). For reporting entitlements, see [Identity verification licensing](../../fundamentals/licensing.md#identity-verification). For investigation guidance, see [Identity verification reporting](howto-authentication-methods-activity.md#identity-verification-reporting).
106 +
107 +### Credential assurance classification (preview)
108 +
109 +Credential assurance describes how a passkey is tied to identity verification. Review the classification of the individual passkey rather than treating every credential on a verified account as equivalent.
110 +
111 +| Classification | Meaning for passkeys during preview |
112 +| --- | --- |
113 +| **High** | A new passkey is registered through an identity-verified registration journey. Its provenance records identity verification and an intact chain of trust. |
114 +| **Medium** | An existing passkey is used in conjunction with identity verification, rather than a new passkey being registered in the identity-verified journey. |
115 +| **Low** | No identity-verification provenance is recorded for the passkey, or its recorded chain of trust is broken. |
116 +
117 +Using an existing passkey with identity verification results in **Medium** assurance. It isn't the same as registering a new **High** assurance passkey through an identity-verified journey.
118 +
119 +During preview, this classification and credential provenance apply only to passkeys. An absent classification for another authentication method doesn't establish **Low** assurance. Account-level [identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history) are separate from the classification of a particular passkey.
120 +
121 +Assurance classification is also separate from device or provider attestation, method usability, and the outcome of a Conditional Access policy. A **High** label doesn't by itself grant access.
122 +
123 +### Credential assurance lifecycle
124 +
125 +A passkey's assurance can change when its supporting identity verification changes. Expiration or invalidation lowers **High** or **Medium** assurance to **Low**. Successful reverification restores the affected passkey's previous assurance level. These changes apply only to passkeys whose provenance relies on that verification, not every passkey on the account.
126 +
127 +Use the following table to distinguish identity verification from credential registration and later changes to trust:
128 +
129 +| Event or journey | Effect on passkey assurance |
130 +| --- | --- |
131 +| Identity verification with an existing passkey. | The existing passkey used with identity verification has **Medium** assurance. This isn't a new identity-verified passkey registration. |
132 +| New passkey registration through an identity-verified registration journey. | The new passkey has **High** assurance when its provenance records identity verification and an intact chain of trust. |
133 +| Identity-verified onboarding with new passkey registration. | The new passkey has **High** assurance when registered through the supported identity-verified journey. Completing identity verification alone doesn't establish that passkey registration finished. |
134 +| Identity-verified recovery with replacement passkey registration. | The replacement passkey has **High** assurance when registered through the supported identity-verified journey. Verification history on the account and provenance on the replacement passkey are separate records. |
135 +| Supporting identity verification expires. | Affected **High** and **Medium** assurance passkeys become **Low**. A historical successful verification event doesn't establish that the supporting verification is still valid. |
136 +| Supporting identity verification is invalidated. | Affected **High** and **Medium** assurance passkeys become **Low**. Review the current verification state as well as the passkey's provenance and classification. |
137 +| The user completes reverification. | A previously **High** assurance passkey returns to **High** without new passkey registration. A previously **Medium** assurance passkey returns to **Medium**, not **High**. |
138 +
139 +Review individual passkeys after each change. Don't assume that verifying an account gives every existing passkey **High** assurance, or that a change in assurance means a passkey is unusable. For the account-level evidence, see [Identity verification status and history](concept-authentication-methods-manage.md#identity-verification-status-and-history).
140 +
141 +<!-- TODO: Validate method-detail labels, displayed properties, minimum permissions, supported registration paths, and visibility on preexisting passkeys. Don't infer backfill or automatic upgrades from proposed chain-of-trust schemas. -->
76142
77143 ## Related content
78144
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