Open Redirect in OAuth2 Proxy
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2020-11053
PublishedIn OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.
- Source published
- 7 May 2020 20:30:13 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Aug 2024 11:21:14 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
euvd · EUVD-2021-2541
PublishedIn OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: May 7, 2020, 8:30:13 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 4, 2024, 11:21:14 AM
- Source published
- May 7, 2020, 8:30:13 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 4, 2024, 11:21:14 AM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 22:39:13 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
nvd · CVE-2020-11053
PublishedIn OAuth2 Proxy before 5.1.1, there is an open redirect vulnerability. Users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. This has been patched in 5.1.1.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-601
Original publisher date fields
published: 2020-05-07T21:15:11.530
lastModified: 2026-06-17T02:48:57.090
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:oauth2_proxy_project:oauth2_proxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 7 May 2020 21:15:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 02:48:57 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 16:17:20 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
CVSS 2.0 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.8 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
osv · GHSA-j7px-6hwj-hpjg
Published### Impact As users can provide a redirect address for the proxy to send the authenticated user to at the end of the authentication flow. This is expected to be the original URL that the user was trying to access. This redirect URL is checked within the proxy and validated before redirecting the user to prevent malicious actors providing redirects to potentially harmful sites. However, by crafting a redirect URL with HTML encoded whitespace characters (eg. `%0a`, `%0b`,`%09`,`%0d`) the validation could be bypassed and allow a redirect to any URL provided. ### Patches @rootxharsh and @iamnoooob provided this patch as potential solution: ``` From 4b941f56eda310b5c4dc8080b7635a6bfabccad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Harsh Jaiswal <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 20:38:31 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] Fixes redirect issue --- oauthproxy.go | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/oauthproxy.go b/oauthproxy.go index 1e9bb7c..f8beb4d 100644 --- a/oauthproxy.go +++ b/oauthproxy.go @@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ func validOptionalPort(port string) bool { // IsValidRedirect checks whether the redirect URL is whitelisted func (p *OAuthProxy) IsValidRedirect(redirect string) bool { + matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^/\s+/|\\`, redirect) switch { - case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/\\"): + case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "//") && !matched: return true case strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(redirect, "https://"): redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirect) -- 2.17.1 ``` This issue was also reported to us separately by @mik317 several hours later The fix was implemented in [#xxx]() and released as version 5.1.1
- Source published
- 20 Dec 2021 17:59:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:49:10 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Publisher rating · HIGH