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Evmos' transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2024-32644

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Source published
19 Apr 2024 14:53:44 UTC
Source modified
2 Aug 2024 02:13:40 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2024-1080

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 19, 2024, 2:53:44 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 2:13:40 AM

Source published
Apr 19, 2024, 2:53:44 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 2, 2024, 2:13:40 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 08:27:15 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2024-32644

Published

Evmos is a scalable, high-throughput Proof-of-Stake EVM blockchain that is fully compatible and interoperable with Ethereum. Prior to 17.0.0, there is a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. If a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-662 · NVD-CWE-noinfo

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-04-19T15:15:50.960

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:30:01.047

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:evmos:evmos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
19 Apr 2024 15:15:50 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:30:01 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6

Published

### Context - [`stateObject`](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/state_object.go#L53-L68): represents the state of an account and is used to store its updates during a state transition. This is accomplished using two in memory Storage variables: `originStorage` and `dirtyStorage` - [`StateDB`](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L33-L55): it is the general interface to retrieve accounts and holds a map of stateObjects. ### Impact An external contributor, @iczc, discovered a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the `stateDB.Commit()` method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the `dirtyStorage` and, **if and only if** it is different than the `originStorage`, we [set the new state](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L460-L465). Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore. Below, are described the steps to perform the attack: - User send a tx to a smart contract (SC) that is calling a precompile. - The SC perform a state transition of its state from A to B. - The SC call the precompile. - The SC perform a state transition of its state from B to A (revert of the previous). - Once the transaction is executed, and the final **Commit** is performed, the state A will not be committed to the store because A is the same as `originStorage`. If the tx is executed correctly, this is what happens at the store level: - Initial state A is loaded from the KVStore and the dirtyStorage is set to B. - Before running the precompile, the `dirtyStorage` is committed to the KVStore without changing the `originStorage`. - Now, since we have a `dirtyStorage`, it is updated to the previous value A without changing the `originStorage`. Since the tx executed correctly, the evm calls the commit to persist the dirtyStorage. However, since dirtyStorage is equal to originStorage, nothing will be changed. To summarize, if a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is **critical** since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions. ### Severity Based on [ImmuneFi Severity Classification System](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/13332717597585-Severity-Classification-System) the severity was evaluated to `Critical` since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds. ### Patches The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Reach out to the Core Team in [Discord](https://discord.gg/evmos) Open a discussion in [evmos/evmos](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/discussions) Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) for security questions

Source published
10 Apr 2024 22:04:30 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:10 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2024-2715

Published

Evmos transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles in github.com/evmos/evmos

Source published
5 Jun 2024 15:10:52 UTC
Source modified
3 Mar 2026 04:51:46 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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