Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Directus has a Blind SSRF On File Import

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2024-39699

Published

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. There was already a reported SSRF vulnerability via file import. It was fixed by resolving all DNS names and checking if the requested IP is an internal IP address. However it is possible to bypass this security measure and execute a SSRF using redirects. Directus allows redirects when importing file from the URL and does not check the result URL. Thus, it is possible to execute a request to an internal IP, for example to 127.0.0.1. However, it is blind SSRF, because Directus also uses response interception technique to get the information about the connect from the socket directly and it does not show a response if the IP address is internal. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.9.3.

Source published
8 Jul 2024 15:32:04 UTC
Source modified
2 Aug 2024 04:26:15 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2024-2302

Published

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. There was already a reported SSRF vulnerability via file import. It was fixed by resolving all DNS names and checking if the requested IP is an internal IP address. However it is possible to bypass this security measure and execute a SSRF using redirects. Directus allows redirects when importing file from the URL and does not check the result URL. Thus, it is possible to execute a request to an internal IP, for example to 127.0.0.1. However, it is blind SSRF, because Directus also uses response interception technique to get the information about the connect from the socket directly and it does not show a response if the IP address is internal. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.9.3.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 8, 2024, 3:32:04 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:26:15 AM

Source published
Jul 8, 2024, 3:32:04 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 2, 2024, 4:26:15 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 02:31:13 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2024-39699

Published

Directus is a real-time API and App dashboard for managing SQL database content. There was already a reported SSRF vulnerability via file import. It was fixed by resolving all DNS names and checking if the requested IP is an internal IP address. However it is possible to bypass this security measure and execute a SSRF using redirects. Directus allows redirects when importing file from the URL and does not check the result URL. Thus, it is possible to execute a request to an internal IP, for example to 127.0.0.1. However, it is blind SSRF, because Directus also uses response interception technique to get the information about the connect from the socket directly and it does not show a response if the IP address is internal. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.9.3.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-918

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-07-08T16:15:08.917

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:42:29.847

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:monospace:directus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
8 Jul 2024 16:15:08 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:42:29 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw

Published

### Summary There was already a reported SSRF vulnerability via file import. [https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h](https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h) It was fixed by resolving all DNS names and checking if the requested IP is an internal IP address. However it is possible to bypass this security measure and execute a SSRF using redirects. Directus allows redirects when importing file from the URL and does not check the result URL. Thus, it is possible to execute a request to an internal IP, for example to 127.0.0.1. However, it is blind SSRF, because Directus also uses response interception technique to get the information about the connect from the socket directly and it does not show a response if the IP address is internal (nice fix, by the way :) ). But the blindness does not fully mitigate the impact of the vulnerability. The blind SSRF is still exploitable in the real life scenarios, because there could be a vulnerable software inside of the network which can be exploited with GET request. I will show the example in the PoC. Also, you can check [HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/ssrf-vulnerable-platforms) page with some known cases. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ ### PoC For testing I used the docker compose with the latest directus version. Here is my docker compose file ``` version: "3" services: directus: image: directus/directus:10.8.3 ports: - 8055:8055 volumes: - ./database:/directus/database - ./uploads:/directus/uploads - ./extensions:/directus/extensions environment: KEY: "redacted" SECRET: "redacted" ADMIN_EMAIL: "[email protected]" ADMIN_PASSWORD: "redacted" DB_CLIENT: "sqlite3" DB_FILENAME: "/directus/database/data.db" ``` As a first step it is needed to setup a redirect server which will redirect the incoming request to some internal URL. I did it on my VPS with the public IP. <img width="1035" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296198555-870898b2-7b8a-4857-a8fe-5e28e85241b0.png"> After it I setup a simple HTTP Server emulating the vulnerable application inside the internal network. It just execute any shell command provided in the cmd GET-parameter. <img width="454" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296198963-4465fa15-c6d6-4e8c-92a0-a2ae334ba79f.png"> After it the directus import functionality was used <img width="930" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296199457-d5d8eb2d-1ca8-442e-b1bf-15ddb0f1947d.png"> It initiates the following HTTP request ``` POST /files/import HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8055 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Authorization: Bearer redacteed Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 44 Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8055 Connection: close Referer: http://127.0.0.1:8055/admin/files/+ Cookie: directus_refresh_token=redacted Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin {"url":"http://94.103.84.233:801","data":{}} ``` It can be seen on the redirect server that the request came to it. ![](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296200143-5afc04e8-3651-4f6f-98d2-1f9f7cd3919a.jpg) And we can also see the request in the localhost server (the same host as directus), which confirms the bypass and the SSRF. <img width="437" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296201651-a9b61f5d-0ccd-4e3e-b137-e82fda8f5347.png"> And the rce_poc file was created. <img width="538" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296201869-fed5fa94-ece5-497d-a091-c422b1f540a0.png"> ### Impact The impact is Blind SSRF. Using it an attacker can initiate HTTP GET requests to the internal network. For example, it can be used to exploit some GET-based vulnerabilities of other software in the internal network. ### Fix proposition I think there are two ways to fix this vulnerability: - Disallow redirects for the import requests - Check the Location header in the import request response if it is present. Drop the request if the Location url points to the internal IP.

Source published
8 Jul 2024 15:25:50 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:16 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 17:03 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current