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sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiabl…

Historical advisory saved 13 Nov 2026 02:22:44 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

euvd · EUVD-2024-2773

Published

sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationally expensive. This can be used to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to a denial of service attack. TUF's security model labels this type of vulnerability an "Endless data attack," and can lead to verification failing to complete and disrupting services that rely on sigstore-go for verification. This vulnerability is addressed with sigstore-go 0.6.1, which adds hard limits to the number of verifiable data structures that can be processed in a bundle. Verification will fail if a bundle has data that exceeds these limits. The limits are 32 signed transparency log entries, 32 RFC 3161 timestamps, 1024 attestation subjects, and 32 digests per attestation subject. These limits are intended to be high enough to accommodate the vast majority of use cases, while preventing the verification of maliciously crafted bundles that contain large amounts of verifiable data. Users who are vulnerable but unable to quickly upgrade may consider adding manual bundle validation to enforce limits similar to those in the referenced patch prior to calling sigstore-go's verification functions.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 4, 2024, 8:15:08 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 5, 2024, 2:25:27 PM

Source published
Sep 4, 2024, 8:15:08 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 5, 2024, 2:25:27 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
13 Nov 2026 02:22:44 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

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