Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Some sources, documents or advisories need attention: 275/275 feeds/APIs · 469/469 docs · 7/9 advisories · checked 06:36 UTC Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

CGGMP21 presignatures can be used in the way that significantly reduces security

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2025-66017

Published

CGGMP24 is a state-of-art ECDSA TSS protocol that supports 1-round signing (requires 3 preprocessing rounds), identifiable abort, and a key refresh protocol. In versions 0.6.3 and prior of cggmp21 and version 0.7.0-alpha.1 of cggmp24, presignatures can be used in the way that significantly reduces security. cggmp24 version 0.7.0-alpha.2 release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security.

Source published
25 Nov 2025 19:59:07 UTC
Source modified
25 Nov 2025 20:48:35 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2025-199640

Published

CGGMP24 is a state-of-art ECDSA TSS protocol that supports 1-round signing (requires 3 preprocessing rounds), identifiable abort, and a key refresh protocol. In versions 0.6.3 and prior of cggmp21 and version 0.7.0-alpha.1 of cggmp24, presignatures can be used in the way that significantly reduces security. cggmp24 version 0.7.0-alpha.2 release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 25, 2025, 7:59:07 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 25, 2025, 8:48:35 PM

Source published
Nov 25, 2025, 7:59:07 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 25, 2025, 8:48:35 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
9 Nov 2026 04:08:39 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2025-66017

Published

CGGMP24 is a state-of-art ECDSA TSS protocol that supports 1-round signing (requires 3 preprocessing rounds), identifiable abort, and a key refresh protocol. In versions 0.6.3 and prior of cggmp21 and version 0.7.0-alpha.1 of cggmp24, presignatures can be used in the way that significantly reduces security. cggmp24 version 0.7.0-alpha.2 release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-327

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-11-25T20:16:00.850

lastModified: 2026-10-18T20:10:00.110

Source published
25 Nov 2025 20:16:00 UTC
Source modified
18 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 03:17:36 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-8frv-q972-9rq5

Published

### Impact This attack is against presignatures used in very specific context: * Presignatures + HD wallets derivation: security level reduces to 85 bits \ Previously users could generate a presignature, and then choose a HD derivation path while issuing a partial signature via [`Presignature::set_derivation_path`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.set_derivation_path), which is malleable to attack that reduces target security level. To mitigate, this method has been removed from API. * Presignatures + "raw signing" (when signer signs a hash without knowing an original message): results into signature forgery attack \ Previously, users were able to configure [`Presignature::issue_partial_signature`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.issue_partial_signature) with hashed message without ever providing original mesage. In new API, this method only accepts digests for which original message has been observed. ### Patches `cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2` release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security. Follow [migration guidelines](https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/blob/v0.7.0-alpha.2/CGGMP21_MIGRATION.md) to upgrade. ### Workarounds Users can continue using un-patched versions of library as long as they don't use presignatures in said scenarios where it weakens system security. To be sure, migrate to patched version that excludes presignatures from being used in such scenarios. ### References Read this [blog post](https://www.dfns.co/article/cggmp21-vulnerabilities-patched-and-explained) to learn more.

Source published
25 Nov 2025 20:42:28 UTC
Source modified
27 Nov 2025 09:16:25 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · RUSTSEC-2025-0127

Published

This attack is against presignatures used in very specific context: * Presignatures + HD wallets derivation: security level reduces to 85 bits \ Previously you could generate a presignature, and then choose a HD derivation path while issuing a partial signature via [`Presignature::set_derivation_path`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.set_derivation_path), which is malleable to attack that reduces target security level. To mitigate, this method has been removed from API. * Presignatures + "raw signing" (when signer signs a hash without knowing an original message): results into signature forgery attack \ Previously, you could use [`Presignature::issue_partial_signature`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.issue_partial_signature) with hashed message without ever providing original mesage. In new API, this method only accepts digests for which original message has been observed. ### Patches `cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2` release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security. Follow the [migration guidelines](https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/blob/v0.7.0-alpha.2/CGGMP21_MIGRATION.md) to upgrade. ### Workarounds You can continue using un-patched versions of library as long as you don't use presignatures in said scenarios where it weakens system security. To be sure, migrate to patched version that excludes presignatures from being used in such scenarios. ### References Read our [blog post](https://www.dfns.co/article/cggmp21-vulnerabilities-patched-and-explained) to learn more.

Source published
24 Nov 2025 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
26 Nov 2025 06:15:23 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

osv · RUSTSEC-2025-0128

Published

This attack is against presignatures used in very specific context: * Presignatures + HD wallets derivation: security level reduces to 85 bits \ Previously you could generate a presignature, and then choose a HD derivation path while issuing a partial signature via [`Presignature::set_derivation_path`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.set_derivation_path), which is malleable to attack that reduces target security level. To mitigate, this method has been removed from API. * Presignatures + "raw signing" (when signer signs a hash without knowing an original message): results into signature forgery attack \ Previously, you could use [`Presignature::issue_partial_signature`](https://docs.rs/cggmp21/0.6.3/cggmp21/signing/struct.Presignature.html#method.issue_partial_signature) with hashed message without ever providing original mesage. In new API, this method only accepts digests for which original message has been observed. ### Patches `cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2` release contains API changes that make it impossible to use presignatures in contexts in which it reduces security. Follow the [migration guidelines](https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/blob/v0.7.0-alpha.2/CGGMP21_MIGRATION.md) to upgrade. ### Workarounds You can continue using un-patched versions of library as long as you don't use presignatures in said scenarios where it weakens system security. To be sure, migrate to patched version that excludes presignatures from being used in such scenarios. ### References Read our [blog post](https://www.dfns.co/article/cggmp21-vulnerabilities-patched-and-explained) to learn more.

Source published
24 Nov 2025 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
26 Nov 2025 06:15:23 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 9 Nov 06:36 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current