Signal K Server Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Information Disclosure via Exposed Endpoints
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2025-68273
PublishedSignal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in versions prior to 2.19.0 allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks. Version 2.19.0 patches the issue.
- Source published
- 1 Jan 2026 18:21:51 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Jan 2026 18:56:08 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2025-206138
PublishedSignal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in versions prior to 2.19.0 allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks. Version 2.19.0 patches the issue.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jan 1, 2026, 6:21:51 PM
dateUpdated: Jan 2, 2026, 6:56:08 PM
- Source published
- Jan 1, 2026, 6:21:51 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jan 2, 2026, 6:56:08 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 04:35:26 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2025-68273
PublishedSignal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in versions prior to 2.19.0 allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks. Version 2.19.0 patches the issue.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · NVD-CWE-noinfo
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-01-01T19:15:53.630
lastModified: 2026-10-07T11:10:00.153
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:signalk:signal_k_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 1 Jan 2026 19:15:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Oct 2026 11:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 04:17:10 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m
Published[Note] This is a separate issue from the RCE vulnerability (State Pollution) currently being patched. While related to tokensecurity.js, it involves different endpoints and risks. ### Summary An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks. ### Details The vulnerability stems from the fact that several sensitive API endpoints are not included in the authentication middleware's protection list in `src/tokensecurity.js`. **Vulnerable Code Analysis:** 1. **Missing Protection**: The `tokensecurity.js` file defines an array of paths that require authentication. However, the following paths defined in `src/serverroutes.ts` are missing from this list: - `/skServer/serialports` - `/skServer/availablePaths` - `/skServer/hasAnalyzer` 2. **Unrestricted Access**: Because they are missing from the protection list, the `http_authorize` middleware allows access to these paths even when `enableSecurity` is set to `true`. **Exploit Scenario:** 1. **Reconnaissance**: An attacker scans the server for these endpoints. 2. **Data Extraction**: - Querying `/skServer/availablePaths` returns the full JSON schema of the vessel's data (e.g., `environment.sun.sunrise`, `navigation.position`), allowing the attacker to know exactly what data points are available for targeting. - Querying `/skServer/serialports` reveals connected hardware (e.g., `/dev/ttyUSB0`), aiding in physical device targeting. ### PoC The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by querying the exposed endpoints without any authentication headers. ```python import urllib.request import json BASE_URL = "http://localhost:3000" def check_endpoint(name, path): url = f"{BASE_URL}{path}" print(f"[*] Checking {name} at {url}...") try: req = urllib.request.Request(url) with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response: if response.getcode() == 200: print(f"[!] VULNERABLE: {name} is accessible without authentication!") content = response.read().decode('utf-8') print(f" Snippet: {content[:100]}...") else: print(f"[-] Secure: {response.getcode()}") except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: print(f"[-] Secure: {e.code}") except Exception as e: print(f"[-] Error: {e}") if __name__ == "__main__": print("--- SignalK Information Disclosure PoC ---") check_endpoint("Serial Ports", "/skServer/serialports") check_endpoint("Available Paths", "/skServer/availablePaths") check_endpoint("Analyzer Check", "/skServer/hasAnalyzer") ``` **Expected Result:** The script will output `[!] VULNERABLE` for all three endpoints, showing snippets of the leaked JSON data. ### Impact **Verified Information Disclosure**: During our verification, we successfully retrieved the following sensitive information without any authentication: 1. **Full Data Schema**: The `/skServer/availablePaths` endpoint returned the complete JSON schema of the vessel's data. * **Example**: `environment.sun.sunrise`, `navigation.position` * **Leakage of Internal State**: We also observed entries like `notifications.security.accessRequest.readwrite.attacker-device-32`, which revealed the presence and IDs of pending access requests (traces of our DoS attack), showing that internal server state is exposed. 2. **Hardware Configuration**: The `/skServer/serialports` endpoint exposed the list of connected serial devices. 3. **System Capabilities**: The `/skServer/hasAnalyzer` endpoint revealed whether traffic analysis tools were installed. This information allows an attacker to map the system's internal state and capabilities, significantly facilitating further targeted attacks (Reconnaissance). --- ### Remediation **Update `src/tokensecurity.js`** Add the missing paths to the list of protected routes in `src/tokensecurity.js`. ```javascript // src/tokensecurity.js // ... existing protected paths ... ;[ '/apps', '/appstore', '/plugins', '/restart', '/runDiscovery', '/security', '/vessel', '/providers', '/settings', '/webapps', '/skServer/inputTest', // ADD THESE LINES: '/skServer/serialports', '/skServer/availablePaths', '/skServer/hasAnalyzer' ].forEach((p) => app.use(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}${p}`, http_authorize(false)) ) ```
- Source published
- 2 Jan 2026 15:22:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Feb 2026 03:14:49 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE