Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. In version 3.0.5 and earlier, the `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO). This vulnerability applies to both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments that expose the same API. Commit 9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863 in version 3.0.6 secures password reset endpoints. Several recommended remediation steps are available. Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments. Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.

Source published

12 Sep 2025 17:37:08 UTC

Source modified

15 Sep 2025 15:31:08 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. In version 3.0.5 and earlier, the `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO). This vulnerability applies to both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments that expose the same API. Commit 9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863 in version 3.0.6 secures password reset endpoints. Several recommended remediation steps are available. Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments. Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.

Source published

Sep 12, 2025, 5:37:08 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 15, 2025, 3:31:08 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 03:36:52 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. In version 3.0.5 and earlier, the `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO). This vulnerability applies to both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments that expose the same API. Commit 9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863 in version 3.0.6 secures password reset endpoints. Several recommended remediation steps are available. Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments. Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.

Source published

12 Sep 2025 18:15:34 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 17:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 03:17:18 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Summary The `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete **account takeover (ATO)**. This vulnerability applies to **both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments** that expose the same API. **CVSS v3.1 Base Score:** **9.8 (Critical)** **Vector String:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` --- ### Details * The endpoint `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` accepts an email address as input. * Instead of only sending a reset email, the API **responds directly with sensitive user details**, including: * User ID, name, email, hashed credential, status, timestamps. * **A valid `tempToken` and its expiry**, which is intended for password reset. * This `tempToken` can then be reused immediately in the `/api/v1/account/reset-password` endpoint to reset the password of the targeted account **without any email verification** or user interaction. * Exploitation requires only the victim’s email address, which is often guessable or discoverable. * Because the vulnerable endpoints exist in both **Flowise Cloud** and **local/self-hosted deployments**, any exposed instance is vulnerable to account takeover. This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to **take over arbitrary accounts** (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email. --- ### PoC 1. **Request a reset token for the victim** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"user":{"email":"<[email protected]>"}}' ``` **Response (201 Created):** ```json { "user": { "id": "<redacted-uuid>", "name": "<redacted>", "email": "<[email protected]>", "credential": "<redacted-hash>", "tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>", "tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z", "status": "active" } } ``` 2. **Use the exposed `tempToken` to reset the password** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "user":{ "email":"<[email protected]>", "tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>", "password":"NewSecurePassword123!" } }' ``` **Expected Result:** `200 OK` The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login. --- ### Impact * **Type:** Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure. * **Impact:** * Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address. * Applies to **both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments**. * Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets. * High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required. --- ### Recommended Remediation * **Do not return reset tokens** or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. * Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. * Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). * Apply the same fixes to **both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments**. * Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. * Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts. Credit --- ⚠️ This is a **Critical ATO vulnerability** because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to **all deployment models (cloud and local)**. ---

Source published

12 Sep 2025 20:02:40 UTC

Source modified

15 Sep 2025 15:31:14 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL