Dgraph: Zero Unauthenticated HTTP Admin removeNode Denial of Service

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Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.

Source published

14 Oct 2026 18:34:15 UTC

Source modified

15 Oct 2026 15:06:27 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.

Source published

Oct 14, 2026, 6:34:15 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 15, 2026, 3:06:27 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

9 Nov 2026 05:03:40 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.

Source published

14 Oct 2026 19:17:05 UTC

Source modified

15 Oct 2026 16:17:32 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 04:17:26 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

### Summary Dgraph `v25.3.8` exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port `6080` is reachable. The exposed routes include: - `/state` - `/assign` - `/removeNode` - `/moveTablet` An unauthenticated request to `/removeNode?id=1&group=0` on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to `localhost:5080`. ### Details The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper. Relevant code paths: - `worker/server_state.go:41` - `dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go:295-301` - `dgraph/cmd/zero/http.go:106-129` - `dgraph/cmd/zero/zero.go:475-477` The relevant behavior is: - `disable-admin-http=false` by default - `/removeNode` accepts attacker-controlled `id` and `group` - `removeNode` forwards those directly into `Server.RemoveNode` - for `group=0`, `Server.RemoveNode` immediately calls `ProposePeerRemoval` This means a remote unauthenticated caller can directly trigger destructive membership operations if `6080` is exposed. ### PoC ### Read state without authentication ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/state ``` Observed response included: - Zero node `id=1` - `groupId=0` - `leader=true` - cluster topology and tablet state <img width="1878" height="810" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6a0001c-bcf7-45b6-a301-481f918be98a" /> ### Write-capable route without authentication ```bash curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/assign?what=nsids&num=1' ``` Observed response: ```text HTTP/1.1 200 OK ... {"startId":"1", "endId":"1", "readOnly":"0"} ``` This confirms the admin plane is not merely informational. <img width="1877" height="805" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/caf60927-83ba-495d-8c55-e48343b8a2c7" /> ### Destructive unauthenticated removeNode ```bash curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/removeNode?id=1&group=0' ``` Observed result: ```text curl: (52) Empty reply from server ``` <img width="1877" height="806" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a837c385-1c2d-42b6-a5c9-0d93a974ff4e" /> Immediately afterward: ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/health ``` Observed result: ```text curl: (56) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer ``` <img width="786" height="47" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd5e977d-d046-4626-b3df-155b141564fa" /> Alpha health was still locally reachable, but Alpha logs began repeatedly reporting: ```text dial tcp [::1]:5080: connect: connection refused ``` <img width="1688" height="197" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8ae3bb84-65bc-4951-ad32-5e1c3231c894" /> This confirms the request reached the destructive path and disrupted the Zero control plane. ### Impact Any deployment that exposes Zero HTTP on `6080` exposes destructive unauthenticated administrative capabilities. An attacker can: - read cluster topology and control-plane metadata - allocate IDs and timestamps - invoke destructive membership actions - disrupt the Zero control plane - indirectly destabilize Alpha nodes that depend on Zero connectivity This is a high-value unauthenticated administrative exposure and, in the reproduced case, a practical denial of service against the control plane.

Source published

15 Oct 2026 20:17:22 UTC

Source modified

15 Oct 2026 20:30:07 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL